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ABSTRACT
Britain recently enacted a “right to roam” in the Countryside and Rights of
Way Act (CRoW) 2000. At first glance, CRoW appears to be a dramatic
curtailment of the landowner’s traditional right to exclude; it opens up all private
land classified as “mountain, moor, heath, or down” to the public for hiking and
picnicking. Yet, when viewed in the light of history, CRoW may be seen as
partially restoring to the commoner rights lost during the enclosure period, when
the commons system ended. CRoW also represents a return to a functional rather
than spatial form of land ownership, allowing more than one party to have rights
in a particular piece of land. The new law highlights some important public
values regarding freedom of access that have been all but forgotten in the United
States. The law calls into question U.S. Supreme Court precedent that has
enshrined the right to exclude as an “essential” stick in the bundle of property
rights and serves as a powerful alternative to the Court’s formalistic notion of
property rights. Given the differences in its history, culture, and legal system, the
United States is unlikely to follow Britain’s lead in enacting a right to roam;
nevertheless, the study of CRoW contains valuable lessons for Americans.
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No man made the land: it is the original inheritance of the whole spe-
cies . . . . The land of every country belongs to the people of that country.
—John Stuart Mill1
I. INTRODUCTION
At least since Blackstone, property rights discourse has been plagued by
absolutism, the notion that the right of property should be defined as the “sole and
despotic dominion” over the res, to the “total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe.”2 Property professors and courts generally refer to the
collection of rights that private property owners enjoy vis-a`-vis other landowners
and the public as a “bundle of sticks,” in an attempt to render rather abstract
concepts more concrete.3 The prevailing metaphor, however, lends itself to a
formalistic, absolutist conception of these interests, implying that the sticks, such
as the right to devise or the right to convey, are things, much like your car or your
house; therefore, the composition of the bundle must be an immutable and
essential state of affairs.4
In contrast, many scholars insist that property rights are neither static nor
absolute. The recognition of private property interests involves trade-offs with
community values and egalitarian goals; therefore, the exact composition of the
bundle of sticks must be recognized as a mediation between these interests.5
1. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Book II, Ch. II, § 6 (1866).
2. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2.
3. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES xli (Aspen Publishers, Inc. 4th
ed. 2006); United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 274 (2002).
4. See generally Craig A. Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 281 (2002) (suggesting that bundle of sticks metaphor hinders environmental protection goals).
5. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L. J. 1315, 1345 (1993) (noting that property systems are
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Moreover, the balance struck is always tentative, subject to constant re-
evaluation in light of current needs and norms.6 Certainly, the relative stability of
property rights over time is not only fair to those who strive to obtain them, but is
also necessary for society to function.7 Nevertheless, some evolution in our
conception of the proper scope of property rights is both inevitable and desirable.
The United States Supreme Court has furthered a formalistic, absolutist
conception of property rights by adopting the bundle of sticks metaphor and
placing the landowner’s “right to exclude” at the top of the woodpile. In a series
of cases, the Supreme Court has canonized the right to exclude others as
“essential” to the concept of private property.8 Completely absent from the
Court’s analysis is recognition that the landowner’s right to exclude involves a
balance with the public’s interest in access. The public may desire access to these
lands for the purpose of reaching some communal property, such as a beach or
park, or it may value access for its own sake, to enjoy the aesthetic values the
private land and its surroundings offers. While the public interest has figured into
a few state court decisions on access,9 the Supreme Court has not so much as
mentioned it in upholding a seemingly absolute right to exclude.
Blackstone’s descendants, in contrast, take a much different view of the
balance of interests. Britain’s10 recent enactment of a “right to roam” in the
Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 (CRoW)11 provides a fascinating study
of how the right to exclude may be modified to accommodate public needs
without unduly impacting the interests of the private landowner. CRoW classifies
private land that contains mountains, moors, heath, or downland12 as “open
“a major battleground” on which the conflict “between individual liberty and privacy on the one hand and
community and equality on the other” is resolved).
6. See LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 93 (2003) (“All individual
and public claims [to property] are subject to dispute, discard, evolution, and change, as societally constructed
understandings.”); Eric T. Freyfogle, Eight Principles for Property Rights in an Anti-sprawl Age, 23 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 777, 785-86 (1999) (noting that property rights and ownership norms evolve
over time); Maria Ågren, Asserting One’s Rights: Swedish Property Law in the Transition from Community Law
to State Law, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 241, 243 (2001) (noting that property rights systems change over time, citing
historical analyses of property rights).
7. Freyfogle, supra note 6, at 785 (noting that property rights must be relatively stable to serve economic
functions, yet flexible enough to meet current societal needs).
8. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
9. See, e.g., State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
10. Throughout this article, I have used the term “Britain” as the subject of study. Great Britain, which
comprises England, Wales and Scotland, is technically only a part of the political entity, the United Kingdom,
which also includes Northern Ireland. However, many of the laws and regulations to which this comparative
study refers apply only to England and Wales. Therefore, the reader should be aware that procedures, laws, and
the names of the agencies involved may differ in Scotland and Northern Ireland. In most instances, I have not
noted those distinctions, because they are not relevant to my purpose and would unnecessarily complicate the
article.
11. Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, ch. 37 (Eng.).
12. Downland is defined as “land comprising semi-natural grassland in areas of chalk or limestone geology
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country,” and requires landowners to allow the public to roam freely across these
lands. Thus, CRoW opens up millions of acres of private land to public access,
without compensating the landowners for this limitation on their right to exclude.
As a result, the law represents a dramatic shift in the allocation of the bundle of
sticks.
The impetus for CRoW can be understood fully only by delving into British
history and culture. Britons have long valued public access to the countryside,
which allows the public to fully enjoy its amenities.13 The romantic vision of a
rural walk is enshrined in English literature, from the poetry of William
Cowper,14 John Clare,15 Thomas Hardy,16 and William Wordsworth17 to the
novels of Jane Austen.18 Numerous public footpaths crisscross private lands, and
both the government and private groups such as the Ramblers Association
zealously guard these rights-of-way against encroachment.19 Under a theory of
implied dedication, British courts have consistently recognized the public’s
continued enjoyment of common rights to certain private lands historically used
by the citizenry.
But these rights, as extensive as they may seem to outsiders, have never
satisfied the British public, due primarily to class outrage with an historical basis.
The enclosure of the commons seems to have been the genesis of a long-running
generally within an open landscape. The typical vegetation type is unimproved grassland often with scattered
scrub.” Countryside Agency, FAQ, http://www.countryside.gov.uk/LAR/Access/open_access/FAQ/definition/
open_country.asp (last visited April 7 2007).
13. See MARION SHOARD, A RIGHT TO ROAM: SHOULD WE OPEN UP BRITAIN’S COUNTRYSIDE? 1-2 (1999)
(noting that the British have a “fierce attachment to their countryside,” which is part of the country’s “collective
identity”).
14. See, e.g., Tim Fulford, Cowper, Wordsworth, and Clare: The Politics of Trees, 14 JOHN CLARE SOC’Y J. 47
(1995), available at http://www.johnclare.info (“Cowper found in the landscapes of Buckinghamshire the
virtues he had sought and failed to find in polite society. They were for him places from which order, morality,
even love could be derived when it could not from the actions of gentlemen.”).
15. Populist poet John Clare (1793-1864) often wrote of the joys of the countryside and its importance to the
common man. See, e.g., text accompanying infra, note 23.
16. Although Hardy may be more well-known for his novels, he was also a celebrated poet. Many of his
poems reflect a love for nature and the joys of walking in the countryside:
I went by footpath and by stile
Beyond where bustle ends,
Strayed here a mile and there a mile
And called upon some friends.
Thomas Hardy, Paying Calls, ll. 1-4, in MOMENTS OF VISION AND MISCELLANEOUS VERSES 160 (1919).
17. See, e.g., William Wordsworth & William Knight, Lines Composed a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey, in
WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, THE POETICAL WORKS OF WILLIAM WORDSWORTH 160-65 (1882) (discussed further
infra, notes 286-88).
18. See, e.g., JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE Ch. VII (1813); discussion infra, note 306; JANE AUSTEN,
MANSFIELD PARK 87 (T. Tanner ed., 1985) (lamenting landowner’s destruction of trees).
19. UK Charity—The Ramblers’ Association—Outdoor Industry Supporters, www.ramblers.org.uk/
fundraising/corporates.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2007) (claiming 140,000 members).
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conflict over public’s access.20 As more fully explored below, enclosure con-
verted communal land into private land, profoundly affecting commoners’ rights
and English society in general. Although many public footpaths were preserved
by enclosure orders, the public’s access to many areas over which they previously
enjoyed a general right to roam was summarily extinguished.
The loss of these “roaming” rights seems to have been chafing at Britons ever
since.21 Public discontent with lack of access resulted in celebrated protests, to
which Parliament responded with a gradual shift back to greater access. Rather
than a radical nationalization of private property rights, then, CRoW can be
viewed as an attempt to regain a balance between public and private rights to land
that was upset during the enclosure period.
For Americans, the study of Britain’s right to roam reminds us that there is an
important cost to the recognition of an absolute right to exclude. Rather than
simply accept the right to exclude as a given, courts should carefully consider the
interests it serves and determine whether, in some circumstances, it may be
possible to accommodate greater public access without damaging the private
owner’s interests. The analysis below suggests that the difference in the treatment
of the right to exclude can be traced to important distinctions in the two countries’
histories and cultures. Nevertheless, the new right to roam deserves to be
recognized as a landmark, which validates important public interests that have
been all but forgotten in the United States. Americans may be able to accommo-
date those interests in ways that take into account differences in our cultural and
legal landscape.
This Article will discuss the evolution of the right to roam in Britain, tracing its
origins to the public rights of common held before enclosure. Section II describes
how the loss of roaming rights led the British public first to the courts, where they
gained limited access through common law doctrines such as custom and
prescription. Still shut out of desired areas, roamers then turned to Parliament,
which responded with laws that protected the scenic beauty of the countryside
and, by degrees, increased the public’s access to it. In Section III, the Article
discusses in detail the most recent, and certainly the most dramatic, legislative
recognition of the public’s right to roam the countryside, CRoW. In addition to a
discussion of the mechanics of the legislation and developments in its early
application, the Section will also outline the public values behind the right to
roam. Finally, Section IV will compare CRoW to the fierce protection of the right
to exclude in the United States and explore how it provides access to the
countryside. The article concludes that, despite significant differences in culture
20. As discussed infra, Section II.B, enclosure of common lands occurred gradually over several centuries,
but the most intensive period occurred between 1700 and 1840.
21. See Shoard, supra note 13, at 154-182 (describing history of resistance to exclusion); Dept. of Env.,
Transp. and the Regions, “Access to the Open Countryside in England & Wales: A Consultation Paper, at v (Feb.
1998) (right to walk over countryside has been sought for over 100 years).
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and history, the United States should look for ways to better accommodate the
important public interests behind the right to roam.
II. EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC ACCESS RIGHTS IN BRITAIN
The new “right to roam” established by CRoW can be fully understood only in
the context of Britain’s complex history of public access rights. Before the
enclosure period, British commoners enjoyed a variety of rights to use common
land, which were extinguished when the land was converted to private land.
Although many footpath easements were preserved by enclosure orders,22 the
general right to roam freely over the mountains and moors was not. The public,
however, continued to fight to restore those roaming rights, first through the
courts, with limited success, and then through Parliament. This Section traces the
loss of roaming rights and their gradual reinstatement. The Section begins,
however, with an examination of the footpath system, another means of public
access with a basis in history.
A. THE BRITISH FOOTPATH SYSTEM
Green lanes that shut out burning skies
And old crooked stiles to rest upon
Above them hangs the maple tree
Below grass swells a velvet hill
And little footpa[th]s sweet to see
Go seeking sweeter places still.
—John Clare23
This Article will discuss two types of public access rights in Britain: foot-
paths24 and roaming rights. Footpaths are public easements over private lands
that are confined to a particular defined right of way.25 A right to roam, in
contrast, is not limited to a specific path. Instead, the right to roam gives much
broader access, allowing the public to wander freely over private meadows or
other uncultivated private lands. Under a right to roam, a family could pick a spot
on top of an escarpment or mountaintop and spread out a blanket for a picnic
lunch; in contrast, a footpath easement is for travel only. Footpath easements are
22. Frank A. Sharman, An Introduction to the Enclosure Acts, 10 J. LEG. HIST. 45, 59 (1989).
23. JOHN CLARE, The Flitting, in SELECTED POEMS AND PROSE OF JOHN CLARE 176, 177 (1967).
24. “Footpath” is the common term used to describe a “public way,” which actually encompasses bridleways
and carriageways in addition to walking paths. A footpath, the narrowest of the three types of public ways, is
limited to foot-traffic only. SIR ROBERT HUNTER, THE PRESERVATION OF OPEN SPACES AND OF FOOTPATHS AND
OTHER RIGHTS OF WAY 314 (2d ed. 1902). Even bicycles are typically not allowed on a footpath. See id. at
381-87. A bridleway may be used for traveling either by foot or by horse, and a carriageway or byway may be
used also by motorized vehicles, although it may not be maintained as a road. Id. at 313-14. This Article will use
the term “footpath” to refer generically to these public easements.
25. National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 (ch. 97), § 27(6) (Eng.).
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typically of ancient origin, while roaming rights were only recently granted in
CRoW. As discussed below, however, both these public rights have historical
origins.
Over 130,000 miles of footpaths crisscross England and Wales,26 and on
average each square mile of land contains 2.2 miles of public paths.27 These
trails, worn by countless travelers through the centuries, were historically the
primary routes of communication between villages.28 Before automobiles were
invented everyone except the gentry had to journey by foot or horseback on these
trails, which certainly pre-date the roads built to accommodate vehicular traffic.
Footpaths led to the mills, to the churches, to the springs, to the lakes or coast,
anywhere that people wanted or needed to go.29 On market days, villagers from
all of the surrounding hamlets, laden with goods to sell, used footpaths to reach
the market town.30
Remarkably, many of these paths formed by centuries of use remain in
existence today. Some footpaths span long distances, taking the walker through
the pages of history. For example, the Cotswold Way, a one-hundred-mile trek
from the ancient Roman city of Bath to the historic market town of Chipping
Campden, travels along the edge of an escarpment, offering dramatic views of
sheep grazing in fields lined by stone walls in the valley below.31 The path links
picturesque villages, filled with buildings of yellow Cotswold stone. A day’s walk
may take you through the ruins of an ancient abbey,32 past a castle frequented by
Queen Katharine Parr and King Henry VIII,33 and then to a burial chamber or
“long barrow” dating from the Stone Age.34
Similarly, other paths offer a rich variety of historical and scenic values.
Hadrian’s Wall Path runs along the entire eighty-mile site of the ancient stone
wall built on the order of Emperor Hadrian in AD 122 to repel Barbarian
invasion. The Thames Path stretches 184 miles along the well-known river, from
the middle of London to the quiet Cotswold countryside. Several coastal paths
run hundreds of miles along cliffs and through fishing villages. In Wales,
Glyndwr’s Way runs 132 miles through a spectacular variety of terrain, from wild
26. Mark Rowe, Ramblers Protest the ‘National Disgrace’ of Britain’s Footpaths, THE INDEPENDENT
(LONDON), Apr. 9, 2000, at 13.
27. SHOARD, supra note 13, at 17.
28. KIM TAPLIN, THE ENGLISH PATH 1 (1979) (noting importance of paths for communication, but also for
providing “mental landscapes”).
29. Id. at 3.
30. WILLIAM HOWITT, THE RURAL LIFE OF ENGLAND 125 (Phila., Parry & M’Millan 1854) (1838).
31. See Countryside Agency, National Trails website, http://www.nationaltrail.co.uk (last visited Jan. 13,
2007).
32. The ruins of Hailes Abbey, founded in 1246, are located on the Cotswold Way near Winchcombe. Id.
33. Sudeley Castle is on the Cotswold Way near Winchcombe. See Sudeley Castle website, http://
www.sudeleycastle.co.uk (last visited Jan. 15, 2007).
34. Belas Knap, which dates from 3000 B.C.E., is also near Winchcombe. See Earth Mysteries, http://
britannia.com/wonder/belas.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2007).
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hill country to river valleys, moors and woodlands.35
Of course, there are many miles of footpaths that are not as renowned or
spectacular, but equally as useful in allowing the rural residents to walk to town,
to the grocery store or the pub, or conversely to allow the town dweller to walk
the dog (or themselves) in the fresh air and sunshine without worrying about
traffic. During my recent stay at a country cottage in Britain, three footpaths
passed within 100 yards of the front door, allowing me to walk to several
neighboring villages.
The signal characteristic of these footpaths, and what sets them apart from
most trails in the United States, is that they are almost entirely on private lands. A
walker may climb a stile36 over a fence, or walk through a kissing gate,37 and
follow a path right through a farmer’s rye field or through a meadow full of
grazing sheep. Under British law, the landowner is prohibited from interfering
with this public right of way or discouraging public use of it.38 Even posting a
sign such as “Beware of the Bull” can be deemed an impermissible means of
discouraging foot traffic.39 If a land owner wishes to divert the path, to build a
new structure or for farming reasons, for example, the landowner must first
obtain a diversion order. The diversion will be approved only if another pathway
is provided that is not “substantially less convenient” for the public.40
A recent case illustrates how seriously the British take their footpaths. A golf
course developer started to build a clubhouse directly over a footpath, without
having obtained a diversion order.41 The local council confirmed the public’s
right to use the path and the developer was forced to provide hardhats to the
citizens as they continued to tramp right through the construction site.42 The
conflict was resolved after the developer applied for a diversion and had the path
moved to another location.43 In another case, Andrew Lloyd Webber attempted to
35. For general information on the walking paths of Britain, see the Rambler’s Association website,
http://www.ramblers.org.uk (last visited Jan. 15, 2007).
36. A stile is a set of steps used for getting over a fence or wall.
37. A “kissing gate” is a gate that swings in an enclosure, so that only one person can go through at a time and
animals cannot escape. It is apparently so named because the first person through the gate can demand a kiss to
swing the gate back to let the next person through. Who knew hiking could be so much fun?
38. National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act [NPACA], 1949, ch. 97, § 57 (Eng.).
39. A landowner may not keep a bull on any field crossed by a public way, although there are exceptions. See
Wildlife and Countryside Act, 1981, ch. 69, pt. III, § 59. If a bull is in the footpath area legally, a warning sign
may be used, but it must be covered or removed when the bull is not present. Health & Safety Exec., Cattle and
Public Access in England and Wales, Agric. Inf. Sheet No. 17EW, at 3 (updated Nov. 2006), available at
http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/ais17ew.pdf.
40. Highways Act, 1980, ch. 66, § 119(6) (Eng.) (requiring that decisions on path diversion orders take into
account the effect of the path on public enjoyment).
41. Shirley Skeel, Rambling and Roaming Rights in England: Walkers Rush to Meet Mapping Deadlines,
CAL. COAST & OCEAN, vol. 19.1, 2003, available at http://www.coastalconservancy.ca.gov/coast&ocean/
spring2003/pages/three.htm.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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protect his privacy by diverting a footpath that ran between his house and office,
but the inspector rejected the application because the diversion would disadvan-
tage the public by lengthening the path and lessening its visual amenities.44
The roots of these access rights can be traced to the medieval feudal system.
While the lord of the manor retained ownership of village lands, the villagers
enjoyed complex and varied rights to use common land.45 Rights to the commons
included the right to graze a certain number of animals, to take wood from the
forests for heat or for house repairs, and to take rock or gravel.46 Commoners
could also walk or ride freely over the common or wastelands of the lord; routes
that were frequently used developed into footpaths and bridleways.47
When the land was later enclosed and common rights largely extinguished,
many footpath rights of way survived, either by the enclosure order itself or under
the doctrines of dedication or prescription. The lord, having allowed the public
passage over the land since time immemorial, was presumed to have dedicated
the path to the public or to have lost the right to object due to the passage of
time.48 These doctrines, of course, require proof that a specific, defined right of
way was so used; neither the courts nor the enclosure orders granted a more
generic right to roam. The next Section more fully describes the dramatic impact
this enclosure period had on the public’s access rights.
B. IMPACT OF ENCLOSURE ON ACCESS RIGHTS
The fault is great in man or woman
Who steals a goose from off a common;
But what can plead that man’s excuse
Who steals a common from a goose?
—The Tickler Magazine49
The enclosure of the commons, which extinguished common rights as it
converted common land into private property, completely transformed British
society. Enclosure took place over four centuries, with the most activity occurring
between 1700 and the mid-1800s.50 Parliament enacted the first enclosure act in
44. SHOARD, supra note 13, at 197. Decision of Secretary of State, Diversion of Echhinswell and Sydmonton
Footpath No. 21 (May 30, 1996), available at http://www.hants.gov.uk/scrmxn/c19599.html. Among other
considerations, the inspector noted that the diverted footpath would no longer allow close views of historic
buildings.
45. G.M. TREVELYAN, ENGLISH SOCIAL HISTORY 35-37 (Penguin 2000).
46. Id.
47. Some footpaths date back to Roman times, at least. See ANTHONY BURTON, HADRIAN’S WALL PATH 84
(2003) (noting Roman milestone on the footpath to Vindolanda).
48. See HUNTER, supra note 24, at 316 (citing Poole v. Huskinson, 11 M. & W. 827, 828 (1843) (Exch. Div.)
(Eng.) and Eyre v. New Forest Highway Bd., 56 J.P. 517 (1892)).
49. TICKLER MAGAZINE, Feb. 1, 1821, quoted in THE OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS
10 (2d ed. 1953).
50. J.M. NEESON, COMMONERS: COMMON RIGHT, ENCLOSURE AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN ENGLAND, 1700-1820, at
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either 1545 or 1606, but most enclosure was by agreement of the parties until the
1700s.51 In the early eighteenth century, the pace of parliamentary enclosure
increased: Parliament passed 280 acts enclosing particular areas between 1700
and 1760, and in contrast passed nearly 4,000 such acts between 1760 and
1840.52 This latter stage of parliamentary enclosure has provoked the most
inquiry into the fairness of its impact on commoners.53
Typically, Parliament justified enclosure by an appeal to the national interest.
The commons system, according to those favoring enclosure, had resulted in an
untenable situation, including such problems as “the insubordination of common-
ers, the unimprovability of their pastures, and the brake on production repre-
sented by shared property.”54 Historians generally agree that enclosure brought
more land into production and improved the economy overall by increasing
economies of scale and reducing the inefficiency caused by multiple tenants.55
However, enclosure came at a heavy price to the commoners.
Common rights created a complex system of land utilization. Villagers who
owned common rights in the arable fields might be entitled to graze a certain
number of animals on the common pasture.56 Certain cottages might also have
the right to pasture attached to their occupancy. But even landless commoners
could enjoy the use of the manor’s wasteland.57 They could take wood, turf,
gorse, bracken, and peat to use as fuel.58 Commoners also gathered fruit and nuts,
5 (1993).
51. Sharman, supra note 22, at 47. Parliament’s partition of Hounslow Heath in 1545 could be called the first
parliamentary enclosure.
52. Id. at 48. In addition to parliamentary enclosure, land was also enclosed by private agreement, which
makes study of the subject even more complicated. See Gregory Clark & Anthony Clark, Common Right in
Land in England, 1475-1839, 61 J. ECON. HIST. 1009, 1028 (2001) (attempting to estimate amount of common
land based on statistical study, and discussing the complexity of enclosure).
53. Ågren, supra note 6, at 243 n.8 (citing both favorable and unfavorable treatments of this enclosure
period).
54. NEESON, supra note 50, at 7.
55. Ellickson, supra note 5, at 1392. See also GEORGE WINGROVE COOKE, THE ACTS FOR FACILITATING THE
ENCLOSURE OF COMMONS IN ENGLAND AND WALES WITH A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF RIGHTS OF COMMONS at 2 n.*
(4th ed. 1864) (discussing how the right of common is one of the “conditions of tenure which condemn the land
to perpetual sterility” because of its inefficiency.) (quoting ARCHDEACON PALEY, PALEY’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY,
bk. vi, ch. xi, § 6 (n.d.)).
56. NEESON, supra note 50, at 59.
57. The term “waste” referred to lands that were at best marginally useful for agricultural production or
grazing. Clark & Clark, supra note 52, at 1015. The extent of wasteland depended, therefore, on the economic
value of the crop and agricultural methods. As crops became more valuable and techniques for bringing land
into production improved, lands that were previously thought to be waste became more valuable. Bogs or fens
previously held to be waste, for example, were later drained to bring them into production.
58. NEESON, supra note 50, at 158-59. Wood could also be taken for building or repairing houses or barns.
COOKE, supra note 55, at 7 (describing common of estovers or house-bote). See also Fred P. Bosselman,
Limitations Inherent in the Title to Wetlands at Common Law, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 247, 265-70 (1996)
(describing value of commoners’ multitude of uses of English fens and wetlands, which were destroyed by
enclosure).
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as well as herbs and roots on wasteland.59 Landless commoners could also enjoy
the right to turn out their pigs or geese into the fields after harvest in order to
glean the remaining grain.60 Hunting rights, for deer or rabbit, were also valuable
to commoners.
The origins of these common rights are ancient and somewhat obscure.61
Although the lord owned the land according to royal grant or proclamation,
necessity required him to allow the villagers to make use of some of it, especially
those lands which the lord found to be of little economic value—the “waste”
lands. As long as land was more abundant than people, the system worked nicely:
So long as the population was scanty, land was too abundant to be cultivated for
pasture. After as much as the population could till had been parceled out, with a
reservation of services, there was still a large remaining waste, upon which the
cattle used in tillage might pasture. The waste was the lord’s but its extent was
beyond his power of occupation, and the tenants of his arable lands used it until
he chose to reclaim it.62
But the custom arose as much from the public need as it did from the lord’s
economic surplus. The Statute of Merton in 1235 allowed the Lord of the Manor
to enclose his waste, to some extent, but required him to leave enough of the
waste “for the needs of his tenants.”63 The right was further burdened by
recognition of the commoners’ rights of pasture.64 While fee title might belong to
the lord, the land was burdened by public servitudes said to have their origins in
concessions made to the commoners “in remote antiquity.”65 Thus, common
rights represented a compromise between the needs or demands of the gentry and
those of the lower classes, which enclosure threatened to upset.
There are countless explanations of why enclosure occurred. The economic
explanation is simply that land became scarcer and agricultural prices higher.
Until then, the gentry had tolerated common rights because it was not worth the
cost to enclose the lands. As innovations in agricultural practices made farming
larger tracts feasible, the benefits of enclosure began to outweigh the costs.66
59. NEESON, supra note 50, at 169-70.
60. Peter King, Customary Rights and Women’s Earnings: The Importance of Gleaning to the Rural
Labouring Poor 1750-1850, 44 ECON. HIST. REV. 461, 461 (1991).
61. See COOKE, supra note 55, at 1 (describing attempts to discern origin of common rights in ancient Roman
law and elsewhere).
62. Id. at 4.
63. J.L. HAMMOND & BARBARA B. HAMMOND, THE VILLAGE LABOURER 5 (Harper Torchbook ed. 1970).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. COOKE, supra note 55, at 4 (claiming that the expense of enclosure was not formerly worth the cost).
Cooke argued that the basis for common rights was not legal in nature, but practical: “It has always been
co-existent with the disproportion of land to population; it grows restricted as that disproportion decreases; and
it must every where disappear when that disproportion ceases.” Id. at 1-2. Similarly, the open range was
enclosed in the American west only when barbed wire decreased the cost of fencing. HENRY D. & FRANCES T.
MCCALLUM, THE WIRE THAT FENCED THE WEST 10-11 (1965).
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Moreover, consolidating the land ownership into one owner rather than dozens or
hundreds of common right-holders allowed for more efficient decision-making.67
Under the parliamentary enclosure system, as it developed, any landowner
could petition Parliament to initiate enclosure.68 Although the commoners could
attempt to defeat the enclosure measure, that would require the poor to somehow
acquire the wherewithal to oppose powerful landed interests. Few commoners
were able to afford representation or travel to London to present their complaints
against enclosure.69 Even if they did, commoners had little chance of succeeding
against the more politically powerful gentry.70 Although protests did occur,
including the burning of fenceposts and rioting,71 a commoner could not hope to
“move a dim and distant Parliament of great landlords to come to his rescue.”72
Upon the enactment of an enclosure act, Parliament appointed commissioners
to allocate the lands to be enclosed. The commissioners allotted lands to the Lord
of the Manor, to tithe-holders, and to those who owned land in the common fields.
In at least some instances, the allocation set aside land for the use of the poor.73 In
the enclosure orders, the commissioners also typically set out roads and footpaths
to be recognized over the enclosed lands.74
Landless commoners and those with small allotments were profoundly af-
fected by enclosure and the loss of common rights. Enclosure extinguished the
village economy, in which many peasants eked out an existence on common
lands and thereby could remain independent. Those who lost common rights,
sometimes half of the villagers, sometimes more,75 were not compensated
adequately, or even at all.76 A peasant’s right to gather fuel or to turn out geese or
pigs into the field for gleaning, for example, could and was often suddenly
67. COOKE, supra note 55, at 2 n.* (noting that no owner can “stir a clod” without obtaining concurrence of
other owners) (quoting PALEY’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY, c. xi.s. 6). Cooke also refers to the dispute between
Abraham and Lot, concerning overgrazing caused by both of their cattle herds trying to graze the same fields, as
the first commons conflict. Id. at 3 (citing Genesis 13:6).
68. Sharman, supra note 22, at 49.
69. HAMMOND & HAMMOND, supra note 63, at 19-46. The Hammonds convincingly describe the obstacles a
poor commoner would face in attempting to oppose enclosure. After the enclosure act passed, the commoner’s
prospects of obtaining fair treatment from the commissioners appointed to divide the interests were equally
dismal. Id. at 37 (describing “helplessness” of commoners in legal proceedings regarding enclosures).
70. While one would expect the House of Lords to be dominated by aristocrats, the vast majority of members
of the House of Commons were also landowners. See TREVELYAN, supra note 45, at 286-87 (noting that in
Restoration England, ninety percent of House of Commons members were landowners).
71. NEESON, supra note 50, at 259-93. See also id. at 291 (documenting protests illustrating “deep hostility”
toward enclosure, which was “corrosive of social relations”); Bosselman, supra note 58, at 301 (describing
violence directed against fen-drainage projects).
72. HAMMOND AND HAMMOND, supra note 63, at 21.
73. Sharman, supra note 22, at 59, 65; NEESON, supra note 50, at 174.
74. Sharman, supra note 22, at 59.
75. NEESON, supra note 50, at 61, 72-73.
76. Id. at 16, 47-52 (citing E.C.K. GONNER, COMMON LAND AND INCLOSURE 362-66 (2d ed. 1966) (1912));
Bosselman, supra note 58, at 301 (noting that statutes authorizing drainage and enclosure of fens “made only
minimal attempts to protect the interests of the commoners”).
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extinguished with no recompense. Although some peasants turned to the courts to
vindicate their common rights, those attempts were unsuccessful.77 The poor, in
essence, became poorer, “surrounded by hether (sic) they dare not collect, and by
a profusion of turnips they dare not pluck.”78 Even those allotted small landhold-
ings in the enclosure found it difficult to subsist because of the cost of enclosure
and because of the loss of common rights that supported their small operations.79
Virtually overnight, peasants who had been able to earn a living independently
became desperate for a wage-earning job. This new supply of laborers became
the raw material that fueled the Industrial Revolution. Even the simple loss of
gleaning rights, which allowed a peasant’s pigs and ducks to fatten in the fallen
grain after harvest, could force a commoner from the land and into the labor
force.80
The loss of independence caused by the shift to a labor economy was decried
by many who were now “utterly dependent on miserable wages.”81 In the words
of poet John Clare, enclosure “came and trampled on the grave, of labour’s rights
and left the poor a slave.”82 Just as Thomas Jefferson believed that liberty
depended on a nation of independent landowners, British commentators have
noted that the independence of the commoner, “the most precious gift of a free
nation,” was one of most important casualties of enclosure.83
The loss of common rights triggered an even larger social impact. Many
elderly villagers had been supported by the young, who worked and shared the
wealth from the common fields and pastures. With enclosure, the elderly were
now left to fend for themselves.84 Moreover, the poor, who had been able to
survive on the common rights, were now forced to try to find scarce work, and
relations between the classes became strained and tainted with resentment.85
Owning a common right gave all of the villagers a connection to the land and also
to each other that was lost with enclosure. The system of communal property may
77. For example, in Steel v. Houghton et Uxor, (1788) 126 Eng. Rep. 32 (C.P.), the court refused to grant a
common law right to glean, finding that gleaning rights would be “inconsistent with the nature of property
which imports absolute enjoyment.” Id. at 33. The author of the main opinion, Lord Loughborough, was himself
a member of the landed gentry. See NEESON, supra note 50, at 56-57. See generally Peter King, Legal Change,
Customary Right, and Social Conflict in Late Eighteenth-Century England: The Origins of the Great Gleaning
Case of 1788, 10 L. & HIST. REV. 1 (1992) (detailing the history of the case).
78. THE TORRINGTON DIARIES: CONTAINING THE TOURS THROUGH ENGLAND AND WALES OF THE HON. JOHN
BYNG (LATER FIFTH VISCOUNT TORRINGTON) BETWEEN THE YEARS 1781 AND 1794, at 505-06 (C. Bruyn Andrews,
ed. 1938), quoted in NEESON, supra note 50, at 47 n.92.
79. Sharman, supra note 22, at 66-67; NEESON, supra note 50, at 22 (describing enclosure that “impoverished
twenty small farmers to enrich one”).
80. King, supra note 77, at 24, 29-31 (arguing that loss of gleaning rights contributed to the “proletarianiza-
tion” of rural poor).
81. NEESON, supra note 50, at 14.
82. JOHN CLARE, The Mores, in SELECTED POEMS AND PROSE OF JOHN CLARE 169, 170 (1967).
83. NEESON, supra note 50, at 45.
84. Id. at 198-99.
85. Id. at 256-57.
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have been inefficient, and its demise may have been inevitable, but one should
not overlook the social side of the equation. Communal property often created a
community fabric made up of social relationships that contributed to well-being
in ways that cannot be measured in property value.86
Moreover, even if enclosure was more efficient, scholars roundly condemn its
fairness. Enclosure has been criticized as a legislatively sanctioned reallocation
of property rights from commoners to the landed gentry.87 More succinctly, E.P.
Thompson called it “class robbery.”88 Prior to enclosure, the poor had come to
depend on common rights, taking them “to be as much their property, as a rich
man’s land is his own.”89
In contrast, other scholars praise enclosure as a prime example of the economic
efficiency of private property as opposed to the common pool, glossing over the
redistributive impacts of the allocation. In his seminal article, “Property in Land,”
for example, Professor Ellickson notes: “It is now widely agreed, however, that,
at least after 1700, enclosures in England were usually scrupulously fair to
smallholders, who received new lands in rough proportion to the value of their
prior rights.”90 For this supposed wide agreement, Ellickson cites only Sharman,
who actually concludes after a brief review that “it is not at present possible to
pass judgment” on the fairness of parliamentary enclosure.91 In his one-page
analysis of the “general effects” of enclosure, Sharman notes the dramatic impact
on the poor, who got “little or nothing” out of enclosure and on small landowners,
whose allotments were so small as to be commercially impracticable to farm.92
Ellickson does concede that laborers lost out in enclosure, because they received
no allotments and lost their common rights, but concludes that “most villages
appear to have regarded the last waves of enclosures as welcome reprieves from
archaic land tenure arrangements.”93 This analysis of enclosure thus appears to
86. Stuart Banner, The Political Function of the Commons: Changing Conceptions of Property and
Sovereignty in Missouri, 1750-1850, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 61, 90-93 (1997) (noting that people may value
owning things in common “as an end in itself,” and noting the value of collective self-government).
87. Fred Bosselman refers to the redistribution from commoners to gentry during enclosure as “rent-
seeking.” Bosselman, supra note 58, at 247.
88. E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 218 (1963).
89. DANIEL DEFOE, A TOUR THROUGH THE WHOLE ISLAND OF GREAT BRITAIN, 1724-26, II, at 15-16 (ed. 1962)
(1724), quoted in NEESON, supra note 50, at 107. Interestingly, at about this same time, the movement away
from common rights toward more absolute private property arrangements, and the resulting redistribution of
wealth, was also occurring in India (See V.A. SMITH, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF INDIA 534-36 (4th ed. 1982)) and
in France (WILLIAM H. SEWELL, JR., WORK AND REVOLUTION IN FRANCE: THE LANGUAGE OF LABOR FROM THE
OLD REGIME TO 1848, at 114, 134 (1980) (describing common rights destroyed by Revolution in favor of
absolute property ownership)).
90. Ellickson, supra note 5, at 1392.
91. Sharman, supra note 22, at 50. The page Ellickson cites, page 47, actually makes no mention of the
fairness of enclosures. Id.
92. Id. at 67.
93. Ellickson, supra note 5, at 1392. Interestingly, while elsewhere Ellickson has noted the advantages of
property rights systems based on custom (See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS
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minimize enclosure’s costs, perhaps to emphasize the advantages of private
ownership of property.94
Although one can argue that consolidation of land ownership was more
economically efficient,95 the unfairness of this property redistribution cannot be
ignored. In fact, although historians may debate the impact enclosure caused,96
the consensus is closer to the view of Oxford historian Christopher Hill, who
concluded that “enclosure brought untold suffering to countless numbers of
English men, women and children.”97 Law professor Stuart Banner, who has
studied transitions between property regimes, notes that enclosure favored the
politically powerful, while the poorest commoners often got nothing.98 Dr. J.M.
Neeson, who was awarded the Whitfield Prize by the Royal Historical Society for
her study of common rights, observes that enclosure destroyed a whole class—
the English peasantry—and along with it the “social cement” that bound the
village together.99
The reallocation of property rights that occurred during enclosure is one of the
great case studies of what property rights truly are and how they arise. For
centuries, the public had enjoyed rights of common on the lands of the lord. Then,
suddenly, those rights were extinguished. In some cases, some compensation was
given to those who lost common rights, but the paltry sums offered could not
begin to make up for the rights upon which many commoners desperately
depended.
Banner calls enclosure an example of a transition from a “functional” system,
in which multiple individuals have rights to do things on a particular piece of
ground, to a “spatial” system of absolute ownership of certain territory.100 The
SETTLE DISPUTES passim (1991)) he fails to note that enclosure ran counter to a very well-entrenched system of
customary property rights. See Ågren, supra note 6, at 244 (stating that pre-enclosure property rights were
based on “commonly accepted norms pertaining to the use of land”).
94. Ellickson does, however, recognize certain inherent advantages of communal ownership in particular
circumstances. Ellickson, supra note 5, at 1332-35, 1341-44,1354.
95. Some economists argue that enclosure resulted in significant efficiency gains. See, e.g., Donald N.
McCloskey, The Prudent Peasant: New Findings on Open Fields, 51 J. ECON. HIST. 343, 348 (1991); Michael
Turner, English Open Fields and Enclosures: Retardation or Productivity Improvements, 46 J. ECON. HIST. 669,
688 (1986); Donald N. McCloskey, The Enclosure of Open Fields: Preface to a Study of Its Impact on the
Efficiency of English Agriculture in the Eighteenth Century, 32 J. ECON. HIST. 15, 34 (1972). Others, however,
argue that enclosure produced more distributional consequences than overall efficiency gains. See Robert C.
Allen, The Efficiency and Distributional Consequences of Eighteenth Century Enclosures, 92 ECON. J. 937
(1982); ROBERT C. ALLEN, ENCLOSURE AND THE YEOMAN (1992).
96. See, e.g., Clark & Clark, supra note 48, at 1034 (arguing that the vast majority of common lands were not
truly communal in the sense of free access to all).
97. CHRISTOPHER HILL, REFORMATION TO INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 225 (1969).
98. Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 359, 368 (2002).
99. NEESON, supra note 50, at 46. For information on Neeson’s receipt of the Whitfield Prize, see Royal
Historical Society, Report of Council, Session1993-1994, http://www.rhs.ac.uk/a934.html (last visited Jan. 19,
2007).
100. Banner, supra note 98, at 369. See also SHOARD, supra note 13, at 115-16 (discussing Aristotle’s vision
of private property ownership with communal use).
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recognition of a public right to roam then represents a return to a more functional
approach, in which the landowner’s rights exist alongside the public’s use of the
land for wandering. While Britain will never return to common fields and
gleaning rights, granting the public greater rights of access to private property
must be viewed against the backdrop of this history. Thus, CRoW may be seen as
simply a step toward restoring to the public what it lost during enclosure.
C. LIMITED COMMON LAW RIGHTS OF ACCESS
Beginning with the earliest enclosures, early attempts to regain common rights
of access in Britain came through the common law. After enclosure, commoners
increasingly asked courts to recognize as legitimate their use of enclosed lands.
With regard to public access, the common law favored the continued right to use
footpaths under certain circumstances. However, it failed to recognize a more
general right to roam.
Enclosure threatened to extinguish not only common rights, but also the paths
used by commoners to reach the village or other towns. Sometimes the special
commissioners appointed under an enclosure act would explicitly include a
public right of way in their award.101 In many cases, however, public use of the
footpath simply continued until challenged by the landowner, and the case was
then decided in court.102
In that case, courts would apply the common law doctrine of prescription for
private easements, or implied dedication for public uses, to determine whether to
grant the right of way. These doctrines required proof that the path had been used
from “time immemorial”; if so, under the fiction of the “lost grant,” the right of
way could not be extinguished.103 Originally, the period of adverse use had to
date from the reign of a particular monarch. Under the Statute of Merton (1235),
for example, the date was 1154, the accession of Henry II. The Statute of
Westminster (1275) advanced the date to 1189, the accession of Richard I.
Finally, in 1623 the Limitation Act fixed a twenty-year period of limitation for
actions for ejectment and thereafter judges began using that period by analogy.104
Under the 1832 Prescription Act, Parliament statutorily confirmed the 20-year
period for private easements by prescription.105 The Rights of Way Act 1932
101. HUNTER, supra note 24, at 317.
102. Id. at 317-18.
103. Fitzpatrick v. Robinson, 9 G.IV. 585, 594 (1828); Bryant v. Foot, L.R. 2 Q.B. 161, 181 (1867). The “lost
grant” doctrine presumed that at some point the landowner must have granted the right of way, given the long
period of use. This presumption avoided the admission that the court itself was creating the easement.
104. For an excellent summary of the history of easements by prescription, see R. v. Oxfordshire CC, [2000]
1 A.C. 335, 354 (H.L. 1999) (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding that the public’s state of mind is irrelevant in
determining whether implied dedication exists), available at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199899/
ldjudgmt/jd990624/sun.htm.
105. CHARLES JAMES GALE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EASEMENTS 98-99 (2d ed. 1849).
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prescribed the identical period for public easements by implied dedication.106
In addition to footpaths, commoners sought to maintain many other public uses
of the commons including the use of the village greens for recreation.107 Again,
courts would uphold the villagers’ claims if well-established by custom, which
was basically a variant of the theories behind dedication or prescription.108
Customary public uses upheld ranged from dancing,109 to horseracing,110 to
playing cricket.111 Eventually, this doctrine of custom was incorporated into a
statute seeking to settle these claims by registering public spaces as village
greens.112
The public uses upheld by custom, prescription, or dedication, however, did
not extend to a public right to roam, or servitus spatiandi, however.113 Instead,
courts placed several important limits on these common law doctrines that
prevented their use for broader roaming rights. First, customary rights could not
be established in favor of the general public, but rather were limited to only a
particular group of beneficiaries.114 For example, in Fitch v. Rawling,115 the
defendants were charged with trespass for playing cricket on the plaintiff’s lands.
Although the court was quite willing to support the customary right of the local
inhabitants to play sports on the property, it drew the line at allowing outsiders to
join in. Justice Buller declared: “Customs must in their nature be confined to
individuals of a particular description, and what is common to all mankind, can
never be claimed as a custom.”116 The court did not, however, give any reason for
this limitation.
Second, courts refused to allow roaming rights based on implied dedication,
106. Rights of Way Act, 1932, § 1(1) (Eng.).
107. See generally, CHARLES I. ELTON, A TREATISE ON COMMONS AND WASTE LANDS, WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE LAW OF APPROVEMENT 285-88 (1868).
108. Id. at 285 (“Rights of recreation and exercise may be claimed either under a custom or a grant: but not
by prescription.”).
109. Abbott v. Weekly, 1 Lev. 176, 176-77 (1665) (allowing dancing on village green).
110. Mounsey v. Ismay, 1 Huelst. & Coltm. 729 (1863) (allowing horseracing).
111. Fitch v. Rawling, Fitch & Chatheiss, 126 Eng. Rep. 614, 614-15 (C.P. 1795) (allowing cricket matches).
112. See Commons Registration Act, 1965, ch. 64, § 22(1) (Eng.) (defining a village green, which would
allow public use, to include any land “on which the inhabitants of any locality have a customary right to indulge
in lawful sports and pastimes” or land on which the inhabitants of any locality have indulged in such sports and
pastimes as of right for not less than 20 years). See also R. v. Oxfordshire CC, [2000] 1 A.C. 335 (H.L.1999)
(appeal taken from Eng.) (detailing history of village greens).
113. ELTON, supra note 107, at 289 (“[T]he general public has no such rights by the common law, and cannot
claim them by particular custom”; the use of waste lands for exercise and recreation “raises no presumption of
an abandonment of any private rights by the owners.”). See also Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons:
Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 750-52 (1986) (analyzing
rationales for denying public access).
114. See ELTON, supra note 100, at 290-91. “A custom which may be extended generally to all the subjects in
England, and is not warranted by the common law, but contrary thereto, is void.” Id. at 291 n.(a) (quoting
Sherborn v. Bostock, (1729) 94 Eng. Rep. 648 (K.B.)).
115. Id. at 614.
116. Id. at 616-17.
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because they feared that property owners “would virtually be divested of all open
and uninclosed lands over which people have been allowed to wander and ramble
as they pleased.”117 Because the owner, before enclosure, had very little opportu-
nity or economic incentive to prevent the use of wastelands for roaming, the
courts found no abandonment or implied dedication.118 Instead, even though the
public’s use could be established, courts presumed that the use was permissive
and thus no intent to dedicate could be implied.119
In one seminal case, Blundell v. Catterall,120 the court declined to allow a
general common law right of public access to seashores over private lands. The
defendant, an employee of a hotel in Great Crosby, a village on the River Mersey
(an arm of the Irish Sea), earned money by taking hotel guests down to the water
in bathing machines.121 The Lord of the Manor, over whose lands the defendant
had to pass, objected to this practice and sued for trespass. The hotel employee
did not rely on prescription or custom, because although citizens had crossed the
land for many years on foot, crossing with bathing machines was a relatively
recent practice. The court held that it could not grant a general common law right
of public access, apart from custom and prescription, and it refused to engage in a
balancing approach to access rights:
[P]ublic convenience must in all cases be viewed with due regard to private
property, the preservation of which is one of the distinguishing characteristics
of the law of England. It is true that property of this description is in general of
little value to its owner. But if such a general right as is claimed should be
established, it is hard to know how that little is to be protected, much less
increased. . . . Many of those persons who reside in the vicinity of wastes and
commons walk or ride on horseback in all directions over them for their health
and recreations. . . . yet no one ever thought that any right existed in favour of
the enjoyment, or that any justification could be pleaded to an action at the suit
of the owner of the soil.122
Thus, the court found that establishing a right to public access, very similar to that
granted by CRoW some 180 years later, would be “inconsistent with the nature of
permanent private property.”123
In dissent, Justice Best would have found a common law right, noting that
117. Id. at 291-92 (citing Schwinge v. Dowell, (1862) 175 Eng. Rep. 1314).
118. Id. at 292-93 (citing Att.-Gen. v. Chambers, 5 Jurist. Chy. 745 (1859)).
119. See, e.g., Folkestone Corp. v. Brockman [1914] A.C. 338.
120. Blundell v. Catterall, (1821) Eng. Rep. 38 (K.B.), 5 B. & Ald. 268, 299, 304.
121. Bathing machines were little huts on wheels, which could be rolled into the water. Victorian bathers
could enter the machine in regular clothes on shore, change into a bathing suit and then be wheeled into the
water, which they could enter without anyone ever seeing them in an improper state of dress. The machines were
quite popular in the 19th century and remained in use until around World War I. Wikipedia, Bathing Machine,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bathing_machine (last visited Jan. 16, 2007).
122. 5 B. & Ald. at 313-315 (Abbott, C.J.).
123. 5 B. & Ald. at 299 (Holyroyd, J.).
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“free access to the sea is a privilege too important to Englishmen to be left
dependant on the interest or caprice of any description of persons.”124 Justice
Best noted the public benefits associated with bathing (health, primarily, but also
learning to swim), which use of a bathing machine furthered.125 More generally,
he emphasized the public interest in navigation, promoted by free passage to the
seashore. Best believed that the common law had to adapt to further the public’s
current needs: “As law is a just rule fitted to the existing state of things, it must
alter as the state of things to which it relates alters.”126
Thus, for Justice Best, the proper distribution of property rights between the
private and public owners was not a formalistic exercise, but rather a balance
struck by weighing social policy concerns.127 Even though some members of the
court’s majority also discussed the balance of interests, they struck the balance
differently. Those justices placed far greater weight on the interests of the private
owner, believing that granting a general common law right of access would
render private property meaningless. Conversely, the majority found the public
side of the balance to carry less weight because the public had sufficient access to
beaches through either customary or prescriptive rights, or through the permis-
sive use of private owners. Where there was clearly no harm to the private owner,
Chief Justice Abbott pointed out, the landowner is unlikely to object to public
access or to bother bringing the claim to court.128
In Cox v. Glue129 the court again attempted to strike a balance between public
and private rights. In an action for trespass, the court had no problem upholding
the customary right of the local citizenry to hold horseraces on the ground on the
manor of Derby.130 The fee-owner, by custom, did not have the right to possess
the soil from July 6 to February 14, when the citizens enjoyed a common right of
pasturage, and therefore the landowner could not complain about horseback
riding.131 However, the fee owner also complained that defendants had erected
tents, stalls, and booths, and had thereby made holes in the soil by sinking stakes
and posts.132 Stressing the limitations on customary rights, the court found that
the custom did not extend to disturbance of the soil and therefore the trespass
action would lie.133
124. Id. at 275 (Best, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 278-79.
126. Id. at 282.
127. Justice Best also cites public trust doctrine, which makes this case interesting for those trying to use that
mechanism to further public access to seashores. Id. at 287.
128. 5 B. & Ald. 315.
129. Cox v. Glue, 5 C.B. 533 (1848).
130. The Epsom Derby, England’s oldest horse race, was established in 1780 by the twelfth Earl of Derby. In
due time, a horse race of stature came to be called a “derby.” See dictionary.com, Word FAQs, Derby,
http://dictionary.reference.com/help/faq/language/e49.html (last visited April 7, 2007).
131. 5 C.B. at 548-53.
132. Id. at 533.
133. Id.
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Again, the Cox court made a technical distinction—preventing the citizens
from “trespassing” on the soil by sinking a stake in the ground—in order to place
some limits on public rights over private property. The court could have
distinguished between the types of uses of the soil that had been established by
custom—i.e., grazing horses is permitted, but racing them is not. Presumably,
however, the court did not want to become enmeshed in numerous cases alleging
that a horse was ridden rather than grazed and so drew the line at a place much
easier to police. In addition, an activity that disturbs the soil may be more likely
to hurt the fee-owner than surface activities, so economic efficiency may have
driven the court’s decision.
Thus, while the public was able to protect or regain some of their historic uses
through common law doctrines of prescription, implied dedication, and custom,
courts placed limits on those remedies to prevent their widespread use. In many
cases, courts used a sort of economic balancing test to determine the extent to
which they would honor the historic uses of common land. In the end, the right to
roam the countryside was not recognized as important enough to justify a
common law right. As a result lands that for centuries had been open to the public
for wandering were shut off by the landowner, often with no recourse. Instead of
gradually dissipating, however, public dismay at the loss of countryside access
fermented. Increasingly, citizens turned to Parliament to provide the remedy.
D. FACILITATING ACCESS THROUGH STATUTORY REFORM
The public’s interest in the countryside is focused on two equally important
policy areas: preservation and access. Unless the beauty of rural Britain is
preserved, access will become meaningless. Likewise, unless the public can
enjoy the countryside, expensive measures to preserve its scenery have little
value, rather like hiding a Monet in the attic.134 This Section describes the
measures Britain has employed to preserve its countryside and then details the
attempts to grant access leading up to CRoW at the turn of the century.
1. Land Use Controls to Preserve Scenic Values
The British have always had a deep commitment to the countryside. While
many Americans find bucolic scenes pleasant, Britain’s reverence for its rural
scenery rises to a much higher level. When Britons use the term “countryside,”
they refer to a category of land worthy of special protection. For example, the
Department of the Environment calls the countryside “a national asset,” which is
a “priceless part of our national heritage.”135 The British Parliament created a
134. Or as Thomas Gray put it, like a flower blushing unseen, wasting its “sweetness on the desert air.”
Thomas Gray, Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard, http://www.thomasgray.org/cgi-bin/display.cgi?textelcc
(last visited Jan. 15, 2007).
135. DEPT. OF THE ENV’T, RURAL ENGLAND: A NATION COMMITTED TO A LIVING COUNTRYSIDE, CM 3016, at 9,
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special government body, Natural England, for the precise purpose of promoting
and conserving the quality of rural life and the countryside itself, for the
enjoyment of all.136 While Americans may lament the loss of the family farm and
attack urban sprawl, there is no similar national commitment to the countryside.
Because most of the land in Britain’s scenic countryside is privately owned,
the burden of maintaining its beauty falls mainly on individual landowners.
About eighty percent of British property is owned privately;137 in the United
States, however, only around sixty percent of land is in private hands.138 Thus,
while Americans create public spaces, such as national parks, on government
land, Britain is more likely to use a variety of regulatory tools that leave the land
in private hands, but that significantly restrict development activity.
Britain, in fact, did not create its first national park—the Peak District—until
1951,139 long after the United States had established its first national park,
Yellowstone, in 1872.140 But the British concept of a national park differs
significantly from the American model, in that the British park is not wholly
“natural” in the sense of being insulated from human development activity.
Although some areas are strictly protected as nature preserves, in most parks
mining, timber cutting, farming, and grazing can be found, alongside tourist and
residential development.141 None of the public lands in Britain probably could be
classified as “wilderness” under the American conception.142
Thus, the British definition of “natural beauty” does not refer, typically, to
areas untouched by human hands. Instead, the countryside revered in Britain is
the product of human interaction with nature for centuries. Whatever may have
been its condition before man arrived, “nature” in Britain now often connotes
meadows of grazing sheep or fields of flax, hedgerows, stone walls, and old
14 (Oct. 1995).
136. Prior to 2006, this statutory mandate was fulfilled by the Countryside Agency. Under the Natural
Communities and Rural Environment Act of 2006, these responsibilities were shifted to Natural England, a new
agency that also took on the functions of English Nature, the agency which previously had responsibility for
wildlife and biodiversity. See Natural England, http://www.naturalengland.org.uk (last visited Jan. 15, 2007).
137. Who Does Own Britain Today?, 68 LABOUR RESEARCH NO. 4, April 1979, at 1. In the 19th century,
private land ownership in Britain was also concentrated in a relatively small aristocratic class, but it is now
much more fragmented. Id. Around thirty-two percent of the country, however, is still owned by the titled
families, including some with holdings over 100,000 acres. Id. Conversely, only ten percent of the land in
England and Wales is devoted to national parks, of which none can be classified as wilderness. UK Association
of National Park Authorities, National Parks Facts and Figures, www.nationalparks.gov.uk/index/learningabout/
factsandfigures.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2007). Thus, the British concept of “natural beauty” does not refer,
typically, to areas untouched by human hands.
138. RUBEN N. LUBOWSKI, ET AL., DEPT. AGRIC. & ECON. RESEARCH SERV., MAJOR USES OF LAND IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2002, at 35 (2006), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/EIB14/eib14j.pdf.
139. Peak District National Park Authority, http://www.peakdistrict.org (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).
140. Yellowstone National Park, http://www.nps.gov/yell (last visited Jan. 15, 2007).
141. R.N. HUTCHINS, NATIONAL PARKS AND ACCESS TO THE COUNTRYSIDE ACT 1949, at 3-4 (1950).
142. The Wilderness Act of 1964 defines wilderness as “an area where the earth and its community of life are
untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.” Wilderness Act § 2(c), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1131 (2006).
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barns. Indeed, government authorities recognize that much of the countryside’s
attraction is the result of these rural development features, so their efforts are
aimed as much at preserving stone walls and hedgerows as they are at nature
itself.143
British law contains a variety of tools that protect the beauty of the country-
side. These regulations strictly control development in the countryside for no
other reason than to promote aesthetic or cultural values. Because British law
regarding land development is much more restrictive than American law, it
provides an interesting comparison of how societies balance private and public
interests in property.
In many respects, the process governing land development in England has
much in common with the United States system.144 Control mechanisms in both
countries are concerned primarily with the separation of incompatible uses,145
and secondarily with creating efficient and aesthetically pleasing urban plans.146
Both proceed from a central land use plan. In the United States, most cities and
many counties have a comprehensive land use plan, which is then implemented
through zoning, subdivision, and other regulations.147 In England, the planning
process results in a district local plan that combines many of these aspects.148
The differences in the two systems, however, have important consequences.
First, while the American system allows local governments to exercise primary
planning authority, the British system’s control mechanism gives more authority
over development to regional and national bodies. For example, the Secretary of
State of the Environment retains centralized control over all policy relating to
planning.149 The degree of central control is quite remarkable from the American
perspective, where there is usually little federal or even state level interference
with local land use decisions, except where particular environmental laws such as
the Endangered Species Act or wetlands restrictions are implicated.150 In En-
143. DEPT. OF THE ENV’T, supra note 135, at 101.
144. I will not attempt in this section to make the reader an expert in British planning law, but rather to
provide enough information to illustrate significant similarities and differences in the two systems. For
comprehensive treatment, see ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PLANNING LAW AND PRACTICE (Malcolm Grant & Sir Desmond
Heap, eds. 1996) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA].
145. Sir Desmond Heap explains that English town planning law evolved to deal with “the problem of the
dwelling-house built in the shadow of the factory and of the factory erected in the midst of the garden suburb.”
See id. sec. 1-001.
146. Royal Town Planning Institute, What is Planning?, http://www.rtpi.org.uk/planning-advice (last visited
Jan. 15, 2007).
147. The model act on which all states based their zoning enabling statutes, requires zoning decisions to be
made “in accordance with a comprehensive plan.” See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, A Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act, § 3 (rev. ed. 1924), available at http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnablingAct1926.
pdf; JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW § 3.6
(1998).
148. Planning and Compensation Act, 1991, ch. 34, § 27 (including unitary development plans) (Eng.).
149. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 144, sec. 1-051.
150. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994) (categorizing land use regulation as a
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gland, however, the Department of the Environment (DOE) issues detailed
policies concerning land use planning, which mandate certain planning decisions
in specified circumstances. For example, national policy requires planners at the
district level to strictly control development in the countryside.151 Moreover, the
central government can become directly involved in individual land use deci-
sions: The DOE may “call in” any application for planning permission for
decision in the first instance at the national level152 and landowners may appeal to
the DOE the local authority’s refusal to grant planning permission.153 British
courts have upheld this strong central government role.154
As a result, there is less chance that a “race to the bottom” will develop, in
which competitive forces overwhelm local attempts to control development.
While local officials may feel pressure to waive a restriction to promote the
economic development of an area, regional and national officials should be more
focused on broader interests, including preserving aesthetics. In addition, using
regional rather than local control over the planning process allows the govern-
ment authority to take into account the relationship among various towns and the
rural areas in between them.155 The planners focus on retaining the integrity of
individual communities and specifically prevent one community from becoming
a suburb of another. For example, the plan for the old market town of Chipping
Campden in the Cotswolds specifically prohibits further development along the
road which leads to the small hamlet of Broad Campden, only 200 meters away,
“[t]o prevent the character of [Broad Campden] being swamped by its much
larger neighbour.”156
Although some American municipalities have architectural review boards,
most towns exercise very little control over the specific nature and design of
development, as long as it is within the broad parameters of the applicable zoning
classification and meets the subdivision requirements.157 In contrast, the English
“function traditionally performed by local governments”). Some states, such as Oregon, have moved toward
greater control at the state level. See Jerry L. Anderson & Daniel Luebbering, Zoning Bias II: A Study of
Oregon’s Zoning Commission Composition Restrictions, 38 URB. LAW. 63, 68 (2005); JOHN R. NOLON,
WELL-GROUNDED: USING LOCAL LAND USE AUTHORITY TO ACHIEVE SMART GROWTH 25 (2001) (listing ten states
that have growth management laws that in some way restrict or guide local land use authority).
151. See Cotswold, Eng., Cotswold District Local Plan Amended Deposit Draft § 3.55 (1995) [hereinafter
Cotswold 1995 Draft].
152. Town and Country Planning Act [TCPA] 1990, § 77; see JOHN ALDER, DEVELOPMENT CONTROL 3 (2d ed.
1989) (U.K..).
153. Town and Country Planning Act [TCPA] 1990, § 78 (U.K..).
154. See, e.g., R. v. Sec’y of State ex p. Southwark L.B.C. [1987] 54 P. & C.R. 226, 231 (Gr. Brit.).
155. See Ashley S. Miller, Developing Regionalism: A Review of “The Regional City: Planning for the End
of Sprawl” by Peter Calthorpe and William Fulton, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 842, 846 (2003); Patricia E. Salkin,
Symposium 2005: Supersizing Small Town America: Using Regionalism to Right-Size Big Box Retail, 6 VT. J.
ENVTL L. 9, 54-55 (2004-5).
156. Cotswold, Eng., Cotswold District Local Plan Deposit Draft § 6.7 (1993) [hereinafter Cotswold 1993
Draft].
157. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Mobile, 374 So. 2d 305, 307 (Ala. 1979) (development could not be denied
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planning process becomes heavily involved in the specifics of the proposed use.
For example, in Chipping Campden, the Cotswold District Council refused
planning permission for a housing development because the nature and number
of planned dwellings would be “detrimental to the character and appearance” of
the area and would have an adverse effect on “views into and from the
surrounding countryside and town.”158 The Council determined that the propos-
al’s impact on the landscape would be contrary to policies contained in the county
Structure Plan and the Cotswold District Local Plan.159 The plan was also
rejected because of its “suburban-style layout and house designs, with large
houses in comparatively small gardens.”160 The Council noted that the uniform
design of the houses would be out of character for the area, which contained
“individually-designed properties set in large gardens.”161 While this develop-
ment faced greater controls because it was in an Area of Outstanding Natural
Beauty,162 in many instances British planning delves far deeper than American
authorities do into the design of the development.
Finally, when planning permission is refused, compensation is rarely awarded
in England. Although the contrast can be overdrawn, it can be said that the British
landowner has no legitimate expectation of development absent planning permis-
sion, while in the United States there is a legitimate expectation of development
absent a pre-existing regulation to the contrary. As described below, significant
controls on development have long been a part of British landowners’ expecta-
tions.
Although town planning first became part of British law in 1909, Parliament
attacked the issue comprehensively in 1947, pushed by the need to rebuild the
areas destroyed in World War II in an orderly fashion.163 The 1947 Act
established complete government control over the development of land, by
absolutely prohibiting any kind of development without planning permission.164
because it was “out of character” with area, as long as it met subdivision requirements). See generally DANIEL R.
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW, § 9.09 (2003) (discussing limited authority of subdivision control). While some
communities have architectural design review ordinances, they may be challenged as violating due process or
free speech rights. See id., at § 11.01. There is some movement now toward “form-based” development controls
that may include an architectural design component. Robert J. Sitowski & Brian W. Ohm, Form-based Land
Development Regulations, 38 URB. LAW. 163, 165 (2006).
158. Cotswold District Council, Town and Country Planning Act 1990, Decision Notice, CD. 1466/D at 2
(Eng.). Chipping Campden lies in the Cotswolds, which the planners describe in poetic terms: “Nowhere in
England is there such a lack of stridency. The colours, the grey of the stone walls and of the cottages and manor
houses, the green and gold of the pasture and arable fields, seem softly blended. The landscape is a watercolour.”
Cotswold District Local Plan, Section 2.5, p.5 (1999) (Eng.).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. British law mandates greater protection from development in Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty.
Countryside and Rights of Way Act [CRoW], ch. 37, § 82 (Eng.).
163. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 144, sec. 1-001.
164. Id. sec. 1-002. Under the American system, a developer must obtain approval of a plat if subdivision of
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The most remarkable aspect of the 1947 Act, however, was its nationalization of
development rights. Sir Desmond Heap, Britain’s foremost expert on town
planning, called the Act “the most drastic and far-reaching provision[] ever
enacted affecting the ownership of land . . . and the liberty of an owner to develop
and use his own land as he thinks fit.”165 Landowners would henceforth have no
right to change the existing use of land and, in return for this expropriation of
development value, could make a claim on a £300 million fund.166 Thereafter,
because the government would now own the development rights, landowners
would be required to pay development charges for the benefits conferred when
the government granted development permission (called “planning gain”).167
The plan to nationalize land development rights, however, did not succeed.
The 1954 Town and Country Planning Act eliminated the development levy and
allowed development fund claims only when the landowner had been subjected
to planning restrictions that limited or prevented the development of land.168
Even though development value had not been expropriated, however, the general
rule that no compensation would be granted for refusing planning permission for
new development remained.169 Compensation would be granted only where
permission was withdrawn after it had already been granted or where retroactive
controls on existing development destroyed its value—a vested rights ap-
proach.170 In addition, the concept of planning gain was eventually abandoned as
unworkable, but vestiges of this notion—that landowners owe something to the
community—may be found in the idea of greater access rights.
In 1990, Parliament enacted a new Town and Country Planning Act, along with
several other planning acts relating to listed buildings, conservation areas and
hazardous substances.171 These British laws, which are now the main planning
controls, place significant restrictions on development that would damage the
scenic landscape, illustrating the value the public places on aesthetics.172 In
general, local authorities have broad authority to deny “planning permission,”
roughly equivalent to a plat approval in the American scheme,173 if the proposed
land is proposed; otherwise, only a building permit must be obtained, which is a ministerial act if the proposed
development falls within the zoning classification.
165. Id.
166. Town and Country Planning Act [TPCA] 1947 (U.K.), Part VI; ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 144, sec.
1-003.
167. Town and Country Planning Act [TPCA] 1947 (U.K.), Part VII; see also MICHAEL PURDUE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON PLANNING LAW 416 (1977) (describing the “betterment levy” imposed by the TPCA).
168. Town and Country Planning Act 1954 (U.K.); ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 144, secs. 1-005, 1-006.
169. PURDUE, supra note 162, at 418.
170. Moreover, the Planning and Compensation Act 1991 repealed all existing statutory provisions
providing for the payment of compensation for adverse planning decisions. VICTOR MOORE, A PRACTICAL
APPROACH TO PLANNING LAW 6 (3d ed. 1992).
171. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 144, sec. 1-029.
172. See generally Andrew Waite & Tim Smith, Constraints on Development in the United Kingdom, 13
NAT. RES. & ENV. 353 (1998).
173. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
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development would harm local interests, including preserving the area’s scen-
ery.174 Furthermore, at the national level, strigent restrictions protect historic
buildings, wildlife, and the countryside.175
British planning law also requires municipalities to adopt a “development
boundary,” a feature that significantly protects countryside values.176 Within the
development boundary, development “is acceptable in principle.”177 This hardly
means that development is a foregone conclusion. The development must be “of
an appropriate scale, in sympathy with the form and character of the settlement
and the surroundings of the site,” and it must not have a “significant adverse
impact on the environment.”178 This of course means that the development must
be carefully tailored to the site, and the district council will look closely at the
design and size of the development to ensure that it does not unduly impact its
neighbors or the town in general.179
Outside the development boundary, only strictly limited forms of development
are allowed.180 For example, a farmer would not be allowed to build a new house
on his or her land unless there is a proven need for the dwelling.181 Many
developers have tried to get around the development restrictions by converting
existing agricultural structures, such as barns, into houses or apartments. The
policy also strictly controls this practice, allowing such conversions if they
positively contribute to the local rural economy or relieve other development
pressures, for example.182
Zoning maps may also contain “Policy Areas” that are subject to very specific
controls, many of which are calculated to preserve aesthetic values. In the scenic
Cotswolds, for example, the map for the ancient market town of Chipping
Campden contains Policy Area D, called “The Craves,” which prohibits any
development that would “adversely affect the open character, general appear-
ance, or setting afforded to the surrounding areas or buildings.”183 In Policy Area
L, an area in the center of town, new development is “very unlikely to be
permitted.”184 Thus, these plans may incorporate significant restrictions on
REGULATION LAW § 7.6 (2003) (describing plat approval process as requiring compliance with subdivision
requirements). The actual construction of a dwelling or other structure requires a “building permit,” but this is
typically is more ministerial, requiring compliance with construction codes. Id. § 8.8.
174. Waite & Smith, supra note 172, at 353.
175. Id. at 355-56.
176. See, e.g., Cotswold 1993 Draft, supra note 156, § 4.1.
177. Cotswold 1995 Draft, supra note 151, § 3.54.
178. Id. at 20 (Policy 1).
179. Id. (Note for Guidance).
180. See id. § 3.135 (“[T]here is often the feeling that the unscrupulous might attempt to circumvent strict
controls on development in the countryside, by putting forward a weak or a well-argued but spurious case for a
dwelling. . . . [I]t is necessary to strictly apply rigorous criteria.”).
181. See id. at 20 (Policy 2), 21 (Policy 11).
182. See id. at 32 (Policy 7), § 3.107.
183. Cotswold 1993 Draft, supra note 156, Policy 1.5.2.
184. Id. at 20 (Policy 1.5.5).
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development likely to impair the community’s interest in maintaining local
character.
Many other types of development controls may be used to preserve the British
countryside for the enjoyment of the public. For example, the Countryside
Agency may designate an “Area of Outstanding Beauty” or a “conservation
area,” in which development can occur only in ways that “preserve or enhance
the natural beauty of the landscape.”185 Similarly, English Nature has the power
to designate an area as a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI), by reason of
any of its flora, fauna, geological, or physiographical features.186 Landowners in
a SSSI must obtain government consent for activities that may damage these
values and, at least until CRoW, English Nature typically entered into manage-
ment agreements that provided compensation in exchange for preservation.187
CRoW now allows the agency to prohibit damaging activities without compensa-
tion, as discussed below.188 The control of development goes literally down to the
bushes: the Department of the Environment now requires the notification of local
planning authority before hedgerows over twenty meters long are removed. If the
hedgerow is considered important under certain criteria, the local authority can
refuse permission.189
In combination, these development restrictions effectively preserve the scene
of “natural beauty” coveted by British ramblers. Similar controls in the United
States would quickly run into constitutional takings claims if the restriction
significantly impacted property values.190 While British laws provide compensa-
tion in limited circumstances, for the most part Britain reverses the presumption
in favor of development present in American property law.
2. Increasing Recognition of Access Rights
Sooner than part from the mountains, I think I would rather be dead. . . .
I may be a wage slave on Monday, but I am a free man on Sunday.
—Ewan MacColl191
185. Countryside and Rights of Way Act [CRoW], ch. 37 (Eng.), § 82. Thirty-six of these “AONB”s,
covering about 15% of England, were designated by the Countryside agency, which is now referred to as
Natural England. Natural England, supra note 136.
186. Wildlife and Countryside Act, 1981, Part II (amended in 1985 and by Countryside and Rights of Way
Act [CRoW], 2000).
187. Wildlife and Countryside Act, 1981. Andrea Ross & Jeremy Rowan-Robinson, Behind Closed Doors:
the Use of Agreements in the UK to protect the Environment, 1 ENVTL. L. REV. 82, 86 (1999). For example, in
the Pennine Dales, a management agreement requires farmers to maintain land in grass, to limit use of fertilizer
and cultivation, and to repair barns and walls using only traditional materials, in exchange for payments. JOSE´
MANUEL L. SANTOS, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF LANDSCAPE CHANGE 123 (1998).
188. See infra, Section III.A.
189. Pauline M. Callow, Country Report, United Kingdom, 5 EUROP. ENV. L. REV. 6, 338 (Dec. 1996) (citing
Depart. of the Env. News Release 430 (Oct. 21, 1996)).
190. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019-21 (1992).
191. Excerpt from classic 1930s ballad, “The Manchester Rambler,” by Ewan MacColl. See Dominic
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While land use laws increasingly focused on preserving the natural beauty of
the countryside, Parliament also slowly moved toward granting the public greater
access. Even as enclosure was foreclosing the public’s use of the commons, many
recognized that the growth of cities in the Industrial Revolution actually in-
creased the need for access to the countryside “as a recreation-ground for all
classes.”192 In essence, the battle over the loss of a common right to ramble never
ended. Even as far back as 1868, commentators noted a movement to change
legislatively the results of court decisions that limited public access rights, by
declaring a public right of exercise and recreation on waste lands “without paying
the value of the private rights of ownership.”193 The establishment of a Commons
Preservation society in the 1870s also indicates how long the British public has
been seeking greater protection for public uses of land.194 In 1884, MP James
Bryce introduced the first bill to establish a public right to roam.195 Although the
bill failed, the movement toward greater access had begun. During the next
century, Parliament tipped the balance toward greater public use slowly; finally,
with the enactment of CRoW in 2000, the right to roam was restored. The
impetus for this change thus has deep roots in British history.
In 1932, a large group of ramblers from Manchester trespassed on private land
on Kinder Scout, a windswept plateau containing the highest point in the
celebrated Peak District. The trespassers engaged in this civil disobedience to
protest their exclusion from “some of the best countryside England has to
offer.”196 Confronted by a group of the landowner’s gamekeepers, violence
ensued and some of the trespassers were arrested. Public sentiment, however,
favored the hikers, and after World War II, the government under Prime Minister
Attlee began a movement toward public rights to the countryside. One of the first
steps was the establishment of national parks, including the Kinder Scout area.197
Remarkably, just as Americans now revere the protests of Martin Luther King
and Rosa Parks, which helped to bring down the barriers of discrimination,
Britons now praise the Kinder Scout trespassers as having secured “far-reaching
changes in unjust and oppressive law.”198
In 1939, Parliament attempted to open the mountains to public use through the
Casciani, Why MI5 monitored singer Ewan MacColl, BBC NEWS, Mar. 5, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/
4772328.stm (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).
192. HUNTER, supra note 24, at vii.
193. ELTON, supra note 107, at 301.
194. See HUNTER, supra note 24, at vii.
195. UK Association of National Park Authorities, History of the National Parks, http://www.nationalparks.
gov.uk/index/learningabout/history.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2007).
196. Giles Wilson, The Walk That Changed Britain, BBC NEWS ONLINE, April 26, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/uk/1953035.stm (last visited Jan. 22, 2007).
197. Id.
198. Michael Meacher, MP, then Minister of the Environment, Speech at the 70th Anniversary of the Kinder
Scout Protest (Apr. 24, 2002). Excerpts available at http://www.huntfacts.com/kinderScout.htm (last visited
April 7, 2007).
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Access to Mountains Act. Instead of declaring mountains to be open for roaming,
however, the Act merely set up an “elaborate machinery” for issuance of an
access order for a particular area.199 The process required an application to be
filed with the Minister of Agriculture, but the applicant had to pay large deposits
to cover the costs of the process and many applications were rejected. Moreover,
any access granted was subject to numerous restrictions.200
In 1949, Parliament created “immense changes” in the right of public access
by enacting the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act (NPACA).201
Under this legislation, the system of public rights of way, including footpaths,
bridleways, and carriageways, was comprehensively mapped. Each county
council conducted a survey showing where public rights of way were thought to
exist.202 A landowner or the public could appeal this determination, but would
have to produce evidence contradicting the council’s proposed designation.203
This process resulted in a definitive map, which was deemed conclusive regard-
ing these easements.204 The map is reviewed periodically to conform to changes
or new information.205 A new right of way may be created, but only by
compensating the owner.206 The Act also provided the national government with
authority to establish long-distance routes.207
The NPACA was important because it systematically confirmed public rights
of way and established a procedure for administratively determining rights over
controversial paths. If a landowner challenged the existence of a path, both sides
could produce evidence of use or nonuse, and the matter could be settled rather
quickly and inexpensively. Thus, the Act created much greater certainty regard-
ing the existence and location of footpaths, which furthered the public’s confi-
dence in using them.
The NPACA also allowed the government to issue compulsory orders to open
up private land to public roaming.208 However, this attempt to provide roaming
rights failed. In order to issue a compulsory order, the permission of three cabinet
ministers was required, a cumbersome process had to be followed, and compen-
sation paid.209 Moreover, the request for an access order had to come from a
199. SHOARD, supra note 13, at 182.
200. Id. at 182-83.
201. HUTCHINS, supra note 141, at iii.
202. Id. at 13-14.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 15.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 17 (citing National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act [NPACA], 1949, ch. 97, §§ 46, 107
(Eng.).
207. Id. at 20 (citing National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act [NPACA], 1949, ch. 97, §§ 51-55
(Eng.).
208. National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act [NPACA], 1949, ch. 97, §§ 59, 70 (Eng.).
209. SHOARD, supra note 13, at 30-31. The Access to Mountains Act of 1939 also failed in its attempt to
provide access for similar reasons. Id. at 182. Interestingly, one commentator indicated that Parliament declined
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county council, many of which were dominated by landowners or locals reluctant
to open the land to outsiders.210 Only two access orders were ever issued under
NPACA.211 Thus, the public’s desire for greater countryside access remained
unsatisfied—that is, until the enactment of the Countryside and Rights of Way
Act in 2000.
III. COUNTRYSIDE AND RIGHTS OF WAY ACT (CROW) 2000
Although the extensive network of footpaths, coupled with the establishment
of public lands under NPACA, gave Britons significant opportunities for walking
in the countryside, the public wanted still more. Footpaths were confined to
limited routes and some desirable lands had no public access at all. Marion
Shoard, a major proponent of greater access rights, asked a simple question:
“Why shouldn’t people be able to go where they wanted to go?”212
Britons also looked jealously at the far greater access rights provided by their
European neighbors.213 For example, in Sweden, Finland, and Norway, the
public enjoys “allemansra¨tten,” which allows a general right of access to all land
in the countryside, although the right stems from custom rather than explicit law.
Pursuant to allemansra¨tten, the public may walk over any private land, unless it
would conflict with privacy (near houses or other dwellings) or would interfere
with growing crops.214 Far more than just walking, allemansra¨tten gives the
public the right to picnic or camp, and even gather mushrooms or berries.215
Other countries, such as Germany, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria, and Spain,
also give the public broad access rights to certain types of private lands,216 and
Britons wondered why they could not enjoy them as well.
Public sentiment for roaming rights began to grow in the 1990s. Ramblers’
rights groups conducted mass occupations of countryside areas.217 In 1994, the
Labour Party, then out of power, made the public right of access part of its
platform at its annual conference.218 So, when Labour ended eighteen years of
to include a general right to roam in NPACA not because they were convinced that landowners would be unduly
burdened, but because they believed owners typically allowed access anyway. HUTCHINS, supra note 137, at 22.
See also HUNTER, supra note 23, at vii (“[T]he public owe much to the generosity and good sense of
land-owners; but the use of the country for purposes of recreation should not be left to depend entirely upon the
goodwill of a limited class. . . .”).
210. SHOARD, supra note 13, at 189-90.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 5.
213. Id. at 261.
214. For a general description of the allemansra¨tten in Sweden, for example, see Naturvårdsverket,
Allemansra¨tten, http://www.naturvardsverket.se/allemansratten (last visited Jan. 18, 2007).
215. Id.
216. SHOARD, supra note 13, at 6.
217. Id. at 4 (describing “The Land is Ours” movement).
218. Id. at 6.
404 THE GEORGETOWN INT’L ENVTL. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:375
Conservative Party rule in 1997, the people expected action to be taken.219 The
Blair government began in February 1998 by issuing a consultation paper to
solicit comments on how best to provide access to the countryside, especially
mountain, moor, heath, down, and registered common land, which it estimated
was some 1.2 to 1.8 million hectares or around ten percent of the land area of
England and Wales.220
Landowners, of course, were understandably wary of the new proposals. They
feared not only a loss of property value due to the imposition of an easement, but
also increased costs of liability insurance, greater need for supervision of
livestock, increased costs to repair fences and other damage, and even costs for
the provision of access in the first place by installing stiles or kissing gates. At a
minimum, landowner rights groups believed the government should compensate
them for access or allow them to charge users in order to recoup these costs,
which they estimated would be anywhere from £29 (US$56) and £37 (US$72)
per hectare annually.221 Local authorities and recreational users overwhelmingly
opposed compensation, however, except perhaps for improvements necessary to
facilitate the initial provision of access.222 Although a few suggested that roamers
should be required to buy an annual pass for access nationally, the vast majority
opposed any fee for access.223
In the end, Parliament was convinced that the public benefit from opening up
access to these lands far outweighed the additional burden on the landowners.224
The government estimated that costs to landowners would be minimal, especially
on land that was not used for hunting.225 Damage caused by access users, such as
vandalism, erosion, littering, and stock worrying, was anticipated to be rare.226
For sites that would be infrequently visited and were not used by landowners for
hunting, annual costs to landowners were thought to be extremely low, estimated
219. Id. at 6-7. See, e.g., Labour Party, 1997 Manifesto (1997), http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/
1997/1997-labour-manifesto.shtml (last visited Jan. 20, 2007) (promising public “greater freedom to explore
our open countryside”).
220. Consultation Paper, DEPT. FOR ENV’T, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, Access to the Open Countryside
in England and Wales (Feb. 1998). See also DEPT. FOR ENV’T, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, Appraisal of
Options on Access to the Open Countryside of England and Wales (Mar. 1999), http://www.defra.gov.uk/
WILDLIFE-COUNTRYSIDE/access/index.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2007). A hectare is roughly equiva-
lent to 2.5 acres.
221. DEPT. FOR ENV’T, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, Analysis of Response to the Open Countryside Consulta-
tion Paper (Mar. 1999), http://www.defra.gov.uk/WILDLIFE-COUNTRYSIDE/access/index.htm (last visited
Jan. 17, 2007) (The total annual costs to landowners were estimated to be between £21 million and £88 million,
or between US$40 and US$170 million).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. SHOARD, supra note 13, at 259 (arguing that the ability to exploit property for economic gain can
co-exist with right of access).
225. DEPT. FOR ENV’T, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, Appraisal of Options, supra note 220, ch. 7.
226. Id. tbl. 7.1.
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to range from £.06 to £.51 per hectare.227 At the upper end, however, for popular
sites also used for hunting, landowners might lose as much as £8.70 per hectare
when loss of hunting income was considered.228 The government estimate of
benefits to the public, based on a “willingness to pay” analysis, ranged from £.39
per hectare for infrequently used upland sites to £87.50 for frequently used
lowland areas.
In introducing its Right to Roam proposal, the Blair administration set out its
case for this readjustment in rights:
In a crowded island, we are fortunate to have some of the most beautiful
landscapes to be found anywhere in the world. But through England and Wales,
from mountain and moorland to heath, down and ancient common lands, some
of our finest countryside has been closed to public access for centuries.229
Although the government considered alternatives, including a largely voluntary
access plan with compensation incentives and condemnation of access with
landowner payments, both options entailed much higher implementation and
administration costs.230 Moreover, experience with the voluntary approach under
previous acts increased skepticism of that mechanism.231 Therefore, the adminis-
tration settled on a new statutory right of access to the open countryside, coupled
with restrictions to protect landowner interests.232 While the national government
would not compensate landowners, local authorities could assist with the costs of
providing access, and landowner liability for any injuries would be limited.233
Thus, the government believed it had struck the proper balance between interests
of the public and the landowners.234
A. MECHANICS OF LEGISLATION
In 2000, the British Parliament enacted CRoW, which opened up certain
categories of private property to public access. Under this Act, the public has the
right to wander over registered “common land” and lands classified as “open
country,” consisting of mountain, moorland, heath and downland.235 Lands
227. Id. These estimates translate to between US$.12 and US$1 per hectare.
228. Id. tbl. 7.2.
229. DEPT. FOR ENV’T, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, Access to the Open Countryside of England and Wales: the
Government’s Framework for Action (Mar. 1999), http://www.defra.gov.uk/WILDLIFE-COUNTRYSIDE/
access/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2007).
230. DEPT. FOR ENV’T, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, Appraisal of Options, supra note 220, Executive
Summary.
231. See DEPT. FOR ENV’T, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, Access to the Open Countryside of England and
Wales: the Government’s Framework for Action, supra note 229.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Countryside and Rights of Way Act [CRoW], 2000, c. 37, § 1, (Eng.).
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qualifying for access comprise about twelve percent of England and Wales,236
covering millions of acres in England alone.237 Some of the country’s most scenic
real estate was opened up, including areas fought over by nature lovers and
landowners for over a century.238 Vast landholdings that were previously shut off
from the public, including the downs of Wuthering Heights fame in West
Yorkshire and the moors of Dartmoor, which is currently occupied by the Prince
of Wales, are now accessible.239
The public may freely enter lands classified as common land or open country
“for the purposes of open-air recreation,” provided that they do not damage
fences or gates.240 Unlike the footpath easement, wanderers are not restricted to
any particular right-of-way on these lands. The access is primarily for walking
and picnicking; one may not hunt, light a fire, swim in nontidal waters, remove
plants or trees, ride a bicycle or horse, or disrupt lawful activities on the land.241
Breaches of these restrictions will result in loss of the right of access for a period
of seventy-two hours.242
CRoW requires the Countryside Agency to prepare a definitive map of all
registered common land and open country.243 The agency issued maps in draft
form, received comments, and then issued the maps in provisional form in
2004.244 The landowner could then appeal the designation to the Secretary of
State, who could appoint an inspector to investigate and decide the appeal.245 The
inspector could hold a hearing or “local inquiry” with regard to the case.246 The
only ground for appeal with respect to open country designation was that the land
did not in fact consist “wholly or predominately of mountain, moor, heath or
down.”247 Notably absent was any power to balance the rights of the public
against the interests of the landowner. Once all of the appeals were determined,
236. Wilson, supra note 196. CRoW applies only to England and Wales. In Scotland, private land is
presumed to be free to walk on unless the owner has specifically excluded it. Id.; Margot Higgins,
Conservationists Celebrate UK Countryside Bill, March 13, 2000, http://www.enn.com/arch.html?id10848
(last visited Feb. 2, 2007).
237. Natural England estimates that four million acres in England is classified as open country, although
some of that will fall within exemptions to the Act. See English Nature, Walking Into History: New Right
Introduced in Eastern England (Oct. 2005), available at http://www.countryside.gov.uk/LAR/Regions/
eastOfEngland/whoweare/pressReleases/PR_WalkingIntoHistory.asp
238. Mark Rowe, The Right to Roam—but not for years, INDEP. ON SUNDAY, Jan. 14, 2001, at 3.
239. Id.
240. Countryside and Rights of Way Act [CRoW], 2000, ch. 37, § 2 (Eng.).
241. Id. sched. 2.
242. Id. § 2(4).
243. Id. § 4. The Countryside Agency prepares the map for England, while the Countryside Council for
Wales prepares the map for Welsh open country. Land that was registered common land and land over 600
meters above sea level immediately qualified as open country without going through the mapping process. Id.
§ 1.
244. Id. § 5.
245. Id. §§ 6, 8. In Wales, the appeal goes to the National Assembly. Id.
246. Id. § 7.
247. Id. § 6.
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the agency issued the maps in conclusive form.248
Similar to laws regarding footpaths, CRoW prohibits a landowner from
posting a sign “likely to deter the public from exercising” its access rights.249
Thus, any “Keep Out” or “Trespassers Will Be Prosecuted” signs could result in
substantial fines.250 On the other side, the access authority (typically the local
highway agency) may adopt by-laws regulating access rights, and the Country-
side Agency maintains a Code of Conduct to guide the public and landowners.251
Not all land is eligible for access designation. The CRoW exempts land that is
plowed or used as a park or garden.252 Quarries, golf courses, and racecourses are
also exempt. No land within twenty meters (about twenty-two yards) of livestock
buildings may be included. CRoW also exempts any land covered by buildings,
including the “curtilage” of that land, which would normally include the yard or
fenced area around a dwelling house.253
Notably, the declaration of public access rights does not carry with it any right
to compensation. One justification, put forward when the government initially
proposed the scheme, was that, because access would be limited to land not
currently used for development or agriculture, the additional rights would not
significantly harm private landowners.254 The government has agreed to provide
compensation for vehicular access over common lands.255
Landowners were justifiably concerned about their potential liability to injured
roamers. What if a child decides to jump in a farm pond and drowns? What if a
hiker is injured by livestock or slips and falls down a rocky slope? CRoW
attempts to address these concerns by limiting the standard of care owed to those
exercising access rights to the same level owed to trespassers, rather than the
higher level owed to invitees or licensees.256 Moreover, the act specifically
provides that land occupiers will incur no liability for risks arising from natural
features of the landscape, water (river, stream, ditch, or pond), or passage across
248. For the detailed maps, see the Countryside Agency’s website, Countryside Access—Home, http://
www.countrysideaccess.gov.uk (last visited Feb. 2, 2007).
249. Countryside and Rights of Way Act [CRoW], 2000, ch. 37, § 14 (Eng.).
250. For first offenses, the fine could be up to £200 under the current scale. Refusal to comply with an order
to remove the offending notice could bring much larger penalties (currently up to £1000).
251. See Countryside and Rights of Way Act [CRoW], 2000, ch. 37, §§ 17, 20 (Eng.); Countryside Access—
Home, http://www.countrysideaccess.gov.uk (last visited Feb. 2, 2007).
252. Countryside and Rights of Way Act [CRoW], 2000, ch. 37, sched. 1 (Excepted Land) (Eng.).
253. Id.; see also Explanatory Notes to the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, ¶ 13, available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/en2000/2000en37.htm (explaining exemptions).
254. DEPT. FOR ENV’T, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, Access to the Open Countryside, supra note 229, at 23.
255. Countryside and Rights of Way Act [CRoW], 2000, ch. 37, § 68 (Eng.).
256. Id. § 13; see also British Railways Board v. Herrington, (1972) 2 W.L.R. 537 (Noting that toward
trespassers, landowners have a limited duty not to act with “reckless disregard of their safety”). The property
owner has a duty to warn of known latent deadly hazards, but has no duty to ascertain and warn of all hazards on
the property. Id. Licensees, in contrast, should be warned of all known hazards, not merely the deadly ones,
while invitees may sue due to injuries caused even by hazards unknown to the landowner. Id.
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walls, fences, or gates (except for proper use of a gate or stile).257 The landowner
or occupier remains liable, however, for recklessly or intentionally creating
risks.258
CRoW is a remarkable transformation of the right to exclude others into a
public right to roam. For those landowners affected, the re-allocation of this stick
in their bundle of property rights means that they will have diminished privacy
and possible damage to their land from a potential invasion of hikers or
picnickers. Before Parliament passed the act, landowners complained that the
burdens imposed on them would be substantial. Examining early developments
under this new regime, it is possible to assess the effects of the shift in access
rights.
B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Several recent cases illuminate the adjustments required by landowners under
CRoW. In 2001, pop singer Madonna and her husband, film director Guy Ritchie,
purchased Ashcombe House in south Wiltshire for £9 million (about US$16.5
million). The 1,132-acre property includes a public footpath, which comes within
about one hundred yards from the mansion where the family resides. Although
this caused the singer some concern, she at least knew about the footpath when
she purchased the land, and she has reportedly been pleased that so far walkers
have not unduly invaded her privacy.259 However, the couple did protest when
the Countryside Agency announced its plans to classify about 350 acres of their
estate as “downland,” which qualifies as “open country” under the CRoW.260
That designation would give the public the right to walk across that portion of the
property at will. The famous couple objected at a public inquiry into the matter,
arguing that the land was not suitable as open country and that free access would
violate their privacy rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. An
independent inspector appointed to resolve the matter decided that only 130
acres, all of which were out of sight of Madonna’s home, should be classified as
downland and opened to access.261 Because privacy was not therefore at issue,
257. Countryside and Rights of Way Act [CRoW], 2000, ch. 37, § 13 (Eng.); see also Explanatory Notes to
the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, supra note 253, ¶ 29.
258. Countryside and Rights of Way Act [CRoW], 2000, ch. 37, § 13 (Eng.).
259. Press Release, Rambler’s Association, Rambler’s Association Statement Regarding the Public Inquiry
Concerning Access Land on Ashcombe House Estate (June 18, 2004), available at http://www.ramblers.org.uk/
news/archive/2004/madonnaverdictstatement.html.
260. See Richard Savill, Madonna Wins Partial Ban on Public Walking Across Estate, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK,
June 19, 2004, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml/news/2004/06/19/nmadge19.xml (last vis-
ited Feb. 2, 2007).
261. See id.; Planning Inspectorate, Appeal Decision, CROW/3/M/03/1076 (June 17, 2004), at 4-5, para.
20-22, available at http://www.planning-inspectorate.gov.uk/access/appeals/central_southern/documents/
1076.pdf [hereinafter “Madonna appeal”].
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the inspector declined to consider the privacy aspects of the case.262
Madonna’s case therefore fails to clarify how privacy concerns may impact the
right to roam. Under CRoW itself, such concerns are irrelevant; the only
considerations are whether the characteristics of the land qualify as open country
and whether it falls within a designated exemption.263 Because the Act has
provided, albeit in a limited fashion, for the accommodation of landowner
concerns, such as damage to crops or privacy, there appears to be no room, even
in the extraordinary cases of celebrities, for additional balancing of those
landowner interests. However, it remains to be seen whether extreme applications
of CRoW could run afoul of higher law, such as the European Convention on
Human Rights.264
The European Human Rights Convention does mandate the protection of
individual property rights. Article 1 of the First Protocol (1P1) of the Convention
states:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general
principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in
any way impair the right of a state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure
the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.265
The European Court of Human Rights has construed this provision as allowing
restrictions on use, without compensation, as long as there is a “fair balance”
between the public interest and the burden on the individual.266
The Human Rights tribunal had an opportunity to apply the Convention’s
property protections to CRoW in a recent case involving the Act’s amendments to
262. Madonna appeal, at 4, para. 20.
263. There are numerous examples of appeals in which landowners have successfully challenged the
characterization of their property as meeting the open country definition. See, e.g., Appeal Decision,
CROW/1/M/03/203 (May 7, 2003) (holding that land was improperly classified as downland because it
contained dense scrub and young trees); Appeal Decision, CROW/1/M/02/82 (Oct. 13, 2003) (holding that
qualifying vegetation does not predominate site, as required by methodology). See generally DEPT. FOR ENV’T,
FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, GUIDANCE ON APPEALS UNDER SECTION 6 OF THE COUNTRYSIDE AND RIGHTS OF WAY
ACT 2000, available at http://www.defra.gov.uk/WILDLIFE-COUNTRYSIDE/cl/appeals-guidance.pdf (describ-
ing mapping process).
264. Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms does
contain an explicit right of privacy, though the protection may be modified in the pursuit of the rights of others.
Although Article 8 has been applied primarily in the search and seizure context, it is possible that the European
Court of Human Rights could apply it to CRoW. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5.
265. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 255, Protocol
1, art. 1.
266. James v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8795/79, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123, 156 (1986) (holding that the burden
on a private owner must not be “disproportionate”); Papamichalopoulos v. Greece, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 440, 451
(1993) (requiring “fair balance” between community interests and fundamental rights of individual).
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the government’s nature preservation powers.267 Pursuant to its authority under
the 1968 Countryside Act, English Nature had entered into a voluntary manage-
ment agreement with the owner of a canal, under which the owner agreed to
extensive restrictions on use in exchange for £19,000 (US$37,000) per year.268
Under the 2000 CRoW Act, however, no compensation was required for similar
restrictions, even though they clearly impeded the commercial activities of the
canal owner.269 The court found that the impact of these restrictions could have a
significant economic impact on the landowner.270 Nevertheless, the court found
that compensation would not have to be provided if the benefit to the community
outweighed the impact on the landowner.271 In this case, preventing the land-
owner from harming native flora and fauna was plainly in the public interest and
did not require compensation.272 The court therefore adopted the sort of harm/
benefit distinction explicitly rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lucas.273
Most decisions regarding the application of CRoW involve more mundane
considerations, such as whether the land qualifies as mountain, moor, heath, or
downland. In cases challenging a designation, a government inspector conducts a
visual inspection and receives evidence from experts and others. The land must
consist “wholly or predominately” of the qualifying habitat, which calls for many
discretionary judgments.274
For example, landowners succeeded in removing a popular rock feature, Vixen
Tor in Dartmoor, from open country designation.275 The outcropping was
considered a landmark, which had been open to hiking for thirty years until the
current owners closed it in 2003. Later, the landowner was found guilty of
attempting to change the character of the land to improved grassland (which
would take it out of CRoW classification) by clearing scrub and applying
fertilizer.276 The Countryside Agency classified the land as open access, due to its
character as moor, but the landowners appealed. While the inspector’s expert
determined that the site “probably” had a predominance of qualifying vegetation,
267. R (on the Application of Trailer & Marina (Leven) Ltd.) v. Sec’y of State for the Env’t, Food & Rural
Affairs and English Nature, v[2004] EWCA (Civ) 1580 (Eng.) [hereinafter Leven].
268. Id. These agreements were entered into pursuant to Section 15 of the Countryside Act 1968.
269. English Nature declared the area a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) under the 2000 CRoW Act,
Part III, which “effectively replac[ed] voluntary agreement with mandatory control.” Leven, supra note 267, ¶
14.
270. Id. ¶ 16 (holding that impacts could be “severely detrimental”).
271. Id. ¶ 58.
272. Id. ¶¶ 71-72.
273. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022-25 (1992) (criticizing the harm/benefit distinction
in takings analysis). For an analysis of Leven, see Tom Allen, Human Rights and Regulatory Takings, 17 J.
ENVTL. L. 245 (2005).
274. Countryside and Rights of Way Act [CRoW], 2000, ch. 37, § 1 (Eng.).
275. Appeal Decision, CROW/6/M/04/2889 to 2895 (March 2, 2005).
276. Legendary Dartmoor, The Forbidden Tor, http://www.legendarydartmoor.co.uk/For_bidden.htm (last
visited Jan. 15, 2007).
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certain assessment was difficult.277 The inspector concluded that, because there
was “some doubt” about the predominance of qualifying cover, the site should
not be mapped as open country.278 In protest of this decision, roamers staged
demonstrations at the site, including several mass trespasses.279 Eventually, the
landowners offered to open access under a ten-year agreement, for payments
totaling £400,000, which they said represented their costs.280 In response, the
Dartmoor National Park authority offered £1500 per annum. As of June 2006, the
two sides had been unable to agree on an access agreement and the site remains
closed, despite continued sporadic protests.281
The Vixen Tor case illustrates that, without CRoW, landowners may be
unwilling to grant access without substantial compensation. The failure to
provide compensation for CRoW access thus represents the loss of a valuable
property right. Nevertheless, the shift in property rights effected by CRoW seems
to be surviving claims that it impermissibly undermines fundamental human
rights. As discussed in Section IV below, American constitutional law would
presumably strike a different balance.
C. THE IMPORTANCE OF COUNTRYSIDE ACCESS
[T]his English country! Why any of you ever live in towns I can’t think. Old, old
grey stone houses with yellow haystacks and lovely squelchy muddy lanes and
great fat trees and blue hills in the distance. The peace of it! If ever I sell my
soul, I shall insist on the devil giving me at least forty years in some English
country place in exchange.
—P.G. Wodehouse282
To Americans, CRoW represents a rather remarkable idea—that the public’s
interest in roaming across scenic lands outweighs the private property owner’s
right to exclude. While Americans have traditionally emphasized the privacy
concerns of the landowner, they have rarely considered the strength of the public
side of this equation. This Section will discuss in more detail the interests that led
to CRoW’s validation of the right to roam.
The British commitment to retaining access to the countryside seems to be
grounded in some important public values, including providing for transportation
277. Appeal Decision, CROW/6/M/04/2889 to 2895, at 4-5, ¶ 21 (March 2, 2005).
278. Id. at 5, ¶ 22.
279. Legendary Dartmoor, supra note 276.
280. Dartmoor National Park Authority, Meeting Minutes (March 3, 2006), app. 1, para. 5, http://
www.dartmoor-npa.gov.uk/index/aboutus/au-authoritymeetings/au-report/committee_reports_from_2006.htm
(last visited Jan. 15, 2007). The landowners desired reimbursement for potential damage and litter from access
users, as well as loss of farm income and income from charging admission to the site.
281. Dartmoor National Park Authority, Meeting Minutes (June 30, 2006) http://www.dartmoor-npa.gov.uk/
index/aboutus/au-authoritymeetings/au-report/committee_reports_from_2006.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2007).
282. P.G. WODEHOUSE, MOSTLY SALLY 196 (1923).
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by foot, enhancing the enjoyment of nature, promoting mental and physical
health, facilitating a historical and cultural connection, and building a sense of
community.
1. Means of Transportation. The British tradition of walking in the countryside
was originally a matter of necessity. Footpaths or cross-country rambles were the
primary means of getting from place to place, especially for commoners with rare
access to a horse. Obviously, travel by foot is usually no longer required, when
most people have a car or bike, or can take a bus. But footpaths do provide a
useful and pleasant alternative to the paved road. Without the footpath, a nice
one-mile walk to town, cutting through neighboring meadows, could turn into a
three–mile, dangerous trip on narrow, circuitous paved roads without shoulders.
Ensuring that it is easy to walk from place to place may significantly reduce
reliance on other forms of transportation.
2. Enjoyment of Nature. Roaming rights and footpaths enable the walker to
reach places that are not yet spoiled by urban development, from which a road
would detract.283 A hike may lead to a beautiful vista, or a mountain stream,
surrounded by natural beauty unblemished by concrete and steel. Walking
through the scenery, such as hiking on a footpath through a meadow of grazing
sheep, puts you in the middle of the beauty, and makes you a part of it, rather than
simply observing it through a car window. The effect is therefore more like a
three-dimensional image than a picture postcard. Moreover, the slow pace allows
for a more intimate observation of the wildlife and plants that abound in the
countryside.
3. Mental health. Walking to town by a footpath allows the walker to
“rediscover something of a slower, quieter, more rooted existence,”284 an
advantage that becomes more important as the pace of life increases. Americans
tend to view any physical activity as a competitive event, and the walker striding
purposefully down a crowded street with hand weights and headphones is
perhaps peculiarly American. In contrast, the right to roam celebrates a type of
walking that promotes peaceful reflection and a sense of serenity. Marion Shoard,
a strong proponent of the right to roam, describes the countryside as a “repository
of tranquility.”285
In Wordsworth’s “Tintern Abbey,” the poet basks in the pleasure of once again
viewing the rural landscape along the River Wye, exclaiming that the memory of
“these beauteous forms” sustained him through many nights in noisy cities,
giving him a feeling of “tranquil restoration.”286 Wordsworth found nature to be
283. TAPLIN, supra note 28, at 4 (Footpaths “lead the way to unexpected, hidden landscapes and furnish
peaceful places from which to absorb them.”).
284. Id. at 2.
285. SHOARD, supra note 13, at 1.
286.
These beauteous forms,
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the “anchor of my purest thoughts, the nurse, the guide, the guardian of my heart,
and soul of all my moral being.”287 A walk in the country, therefore, was seen by
Wordsworth and his followers to be a powerful antidote to the “dreary intercourse
of daily life.”288
4. Physical health. Access to the countryside encourages a culture of walking
that promotes physical health. Being able to walk out your front door and within
minutes be striding through peaceful green meadows is more inviting than the
typical urban concrete nightmare. Even Americans who live in the country may
find it difficult to take a walk, being forced by neighbors’ fences to use country
roads with traffic and no shoulders for walkers. Even if the road has a shoulder,
the noise, exhaust and danger detracts from its desirability for healthy and
pleasant exercise. Footpaths or roaming rights make it possible to walk to town
for lunch or for shopping instead of hopping in the car.
Health officials in the United States have strongly advocated that Americans
get more exercise, including walking, to help combat a growing obesity prob-
lem.289 Recent studies indicate that about two-thirds of American adults are now
overweight.290 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention now attributes
over 100,000 deaths per year to being overweight.291Obesity rates among
American adults and children have doubled over the last two decades.292 In
Through a long absence, have not been to me
As is a landscape to a blind man’s eye:
But oft, in lonely rooms, and ’mid the din
Of towns and cities, I have owed to them
In hours of weariness, sensations sweet,
Felt in the blood, and felt along the heart;
And passing even into my purer mind,
With tranquil restoration:
WORDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 161.
287. Id. at 164.
288. Id.; see also id. (Nature informs mind, impresses us with “quietness and beauty,” and feeds our “lofty
thoughts.”). In a similar vein, Thomas Hardy described the mental release accorded by a walk on “Wessex
Heights”:
In the lowlands I have no comrade, not even the lone man’s friend –
Her who suffereth long and is kind; accepts what he is too weak to mend:
Down there they are dubious and askance: there nobody thinks as I,
But mind-chains do not clank where one’s next neighbor is the sky.
THOMAS HARDY, “Wessex Heights,” in SELECTED POEMS OF THOMAS HARDY 43 (John Crowe Ransom ed., 1966).
289. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., Press Release, HHS Secretary Announces Develop-
ment of Physical Activity Guidelines at National Prevention Summit (Oct. 26, 2006), available at http://
www.hhs.gov/news/press/2006pres/20061026.html.
290. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, National Health and
Nutrition Examination Survey (2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhanes/databriefs/adultweight.
pdf.
291. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Frequently Asked Questions About Calculating Obesity-
Related Risk, (May 27, 2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/PDF/Frequently_Asked_Questions_About_
Calculating_Obesity-Related_Risk.pdf
292. Id. Obesity rates for the adolescent group tripled over the same time-frame.
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addition to unhealthy eating habits,293 lack of exercise is the main culprit.
Europeans tend to walk a lot more than the average American.294 In part, this is
due to the design of their cities and towns, which encourage and enable walking,
and roaming rights are an extension of that.
A prime example of the difference in culture is that, in the United States, many
golf courses will not allow you to walk; a golf cart is required to ensure speed of
play.295 Even where the course does not require a cart, at many courses it is rare to
find a walker among the carts. In contrast, on the Old Course at St. Andrews, the
most venerated golf course in the world, only those who can provide documenta-
tion of a permanent disability can use a “buggy” and no carts are allowed at all on
some of St. Andrews’ courses.296 In fact, most courses in Europe require you to
walk unless you are elderly or disabled.297 Footpaths and roaming rights are just
another example of this cultural emphasis on walking.
5. Connection to History and Culture. There is a distinct pleasure in walking a
path you know villagers have walked for centuries before you. The use of land in
the same way as those previous inhabitants results in a connection to the past, to
one’s ancestors, through the land itself. Washington Irving, an American visiting
Britain, captured the concept beautifully when he wrote approvingly of “the stile
and footpath leading from the churchyard, across pleasant fields and along shady
hedge-rows, according to an immemorial right of way.” He believed the paths
“evince a calm and settled security, and hereditary transmission of homebred
virtues and local attachments, that speak deeply and touchingly for the moral
character of the nation.”298 This connection to the past, tied to a sense of morality,
can inspire and motivate preservation of rustic scenes, of which footpaths and
roaming have always been a part.
Perhaps Thomas Hardy was thinking of this feature of a walk in the country-
side when he wrote Wessex Heights in 1896:
There are some heights in Wessex, shaped as if by a kindly hand,
For thinking, dreaming, dying on, and at crises when I stand,
293. See SUPER SIZE ME (The Con 2004) (illustrating the effects of fast-food diet).
294. Recent studies indicate that obesity rates in Europe are rising rapidly, although they are still far below
American rates. Int’l Obesity Task Force, EU Platform Briefing Paper fig. 1 (2005), available at http://
ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determinants/life_style/nutrition/documents/iotf_en.pdf. Europeans walk, on average,
much more than Americans do. A study found that Germans took trips on foot four times more often than
Americans, while the Dutch walked three times more often. John Pucher & Lewis Dijkstra, Making Walking and
Cycling Safer: Lessons from Europe, 54 TRANSP. QUART. No. 3, at 25 (2000).
295. See Therese Droste, Walking the Links is Good Exercise, If It’s Allowed, WASH. POST, May 15, 2001, at
HE06, available at www.popeofslope.com/paceofplay/walking.html (noting that half of the public facilities in
the study required carts).
296. See St. Andrews Links, http://www.standrews.org.uk/golf/book_golf/trolleys_buggies.html (last visited
Jan. 20, 2007).
297. See Alistair Tate, A Good Walk Spoiled, GOLFWEEK, available at http://www.golfweek.com/ourtake/
287547302780100.php.
298. WASHINGTON IRVING, THE SKETCH BOOK 67-68, quoted in TAPLIN, supra note 28, at 17.
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Say, on Ingpen Beacon eastward, or on Wylls-Neck westwardly,
I seem where I was before my birth, and after death may be.299
Even in the United States, legal recognition of a historic connection to land is
quite common. In Iowa, for example, century farms, which have been in the same
family for at least one hundred years, are entitled to special land use protection, to
honor a family’s multi-generational relationship with the land.300 In adverse
possession law, the law recognizes the psychological attachment to land that
comes with continued use over time.301 Historic preservation laws preserve old
associations and a sense of history and continuity in our culture. Likewise,
arguments for wilderness protection in the United States have emphasized their
connection to America’s pre-Columbian heritage.302 Thus, in some ways, walk-
ing an ancient traveled way serves in part as an outdoor, interactive museum and
in part like a visit to the cemetery.
6. Sense of community. The public’s use of footpaths and roaming rights also
evokes a sense of community, arising from the shared ownership of the land.303
Instead of “my land” and “your land,” it is “our land.” Community is also
enhanced by the chance meetings of neighbors that occur along the path. In cars,
even if you recognize someone whizzing by, you can barely manage a wave
before they are gone. On a footpath, greetings are always exchanged, and
typically there is time to stop and converse. Even with strangers, the unwritten
code of the footpath requires a greeting and often a chat about the weather, the
path ahead, and more.304
The right to roam also represents a tribute of sorts to the common man. Nature
poet Kim Taplin notes that “[f]ootpaths were made by common men who were
obliged to go afoot; they are open to all.”305 She highlights the incident in Pride
and Prejudice when Elizabeth Bennett crossed “field after field at a quick pace,
jumping over stiles and springing over puddles.”306 By using the commoner’s
route, “she incurred the class scorn of the Misses Bingley for her muddy petticoat
and red cheeks, but she claims the approval of Jane Austen and her readers for her
299. HARDY, supra note 288, at 43.
300. IOWA CODE §§ 368.26, 403.17(10) (2006).
301. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897).
302. See, e.g., Michael McCloskey, The Wilderness Act of 1964: Its Background and Meaning, 45 OR. L.
REV. 288, 289-90 (1966).
303. SHOARD, supra note 13, at 50-51 (noting that public has more of a “stake” in the land it uses).
304. As William Barnes put it:
We souls on foot, with foot-folk meet:
For we that cannot hope to ride
For ease or pride, have fellowship.
William Barnes, Fellowship, reprinted in TAPLIN, supra note 28, at 50.
305. Id. at 17
306. Id. (quoting AUSTEN, supra note 18, Ch. VII)
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independence and indifference to form.”307 For Britain, which has always had a
hyper-sense of class differences,308 the right to roam is not just a “public” right,
but more specifically a right of those who do not belong to the landed gentry, and
therefore, a right to be protected as fiercely as the right to a decent wage or
universal health insurance.309 In a similar vein, Elihu Burritt referred to footpaths
as “the inheritance of our landless millions.”310
At the same time, public access to private lands helps to break down class
differences by establishing a connection between the commoner and the landed
gentry. On the footpath, everyone is equal, regardless of who owns the land.
Instead of the imposing exclusivity of the modern American gated community,
the English footpath allows the poorest plebeian to walk right across Madonna’s
estate.
In conclusion, the public interest supporting a right to roam over private land
stems from a variety of significant social values. Its strongest appeal may be the
sense of “tranquil restoration,” as Wordsworth called it, that a walk in the country
brings. In that way, countryside access is cheaper than psychological counseling,
and given its physical benefits, may reduce national health costs as well. Yet, the
private property owner’s right to exclude, against which these public benefits are
balanced, is also supported by strong policy reasons, which will be discussed
more fully below.
IV. ACCESS RIGHTS IN UNITED STATES IN COMPARISON
An American farmer would plough across any such path . . . but here, it is
protected by law, and still more by the sacredness that inevitably springs up, in
this soil, along the well-defined footprints of the centuries. Old associations are
sure to be fragrant herbs in English nostrils, we pull them up as weeds.
—Nathaniel Hawthorne311
In the United States, the balance between public and private rights to land is
tipped decidedly toward the landowner. Public access rights are much more
limited, although there are some rare instances of easements established by
customary use. Moreover, as a matter of constitutional law, a legislative curtail-
ment of the right to exclude, by recognizing a right to roam as in CRoW or even
307. Id.
308. DAVID CANNADINE, CLASS IN BRITAIN (Penguin 2000). The author is a London University historian who
believes class distinctions remain extremely important in Britain. Id.
309. Robin Hood, it may be recalled, was not only stealing from the rich to give to the poor, but was also a
prominent poacher on the land of the ruling class. See Robyn Hod and the Shryff off Notyngham, introduction to
ROBIN HOOD AND OTHER OUTLAW TALES 269, 269 (Stephen Knight & Thomas H. Ohlgren eds., 1997) (noting
that the Robin Hood story, which emphasized defiance of authority, was “the most popular form of secular
dramatic entertainment in provincial England for most of the sixteenth century”).
310. ELIHU BURRITT, A WALK FROM LONDON TO JOHN O’GROATS 10 (2d ed. 1864).
311. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, OUR OLD HOME 69 (1891), quoted in TAPLIN, supra note 28, at 18.
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more limited public access rights, probably would be impossible to sustain
without compensation. The contrast in approach stems not only from the
differences in the two countries’ legal systems, but also from cultural differences
that have their roots in the history of United States land development.
A. HISTORY OF U.S. LAND DEVELOPMENT
In Britain, as we have seen, the public’s claim to greater access rights is
grounded firmly in their historic use of the property before enclosure. Although
the history of land tenure in Britain is complex, its origin in a feudal system
resulted in land that was held subject to the interests of many holders. After the
Norman conquest, monarchs were deemed the eminent owners of all property
and parceled out large tracts to lords by royal edict.312 In return for services, a
tenant might hold certain property of the lord, but neither could be said to be
absolute owner.313 Of necessity, the commoners living on or near the land had to
be taken care of, and common rights arose as a natural consequence. Commoners
made great use of the lord’s wastelands, which lords countenanced or tolerated.
From an economic standpoint, it would have been impossible for the lords to
police their wastelands, and since they did not derive necessary income from
them, the expense of policing did not merit the cost. Historically, then, “owner-
ship” of British property has always been subject to the rights of others, either the
kings above or the tenants or commoners below.
In constrast, American land was initially distributed to individual landowners
in fee simple without encumbrances.314 Some commons arrangements did exist
in the colonies, but in most instances the colonists quickly reverted to a private
ownership scheme. Professor Ellickson has described how private property rights
in the colonies led to economic prosperity, after communal ownership led to
economic disaster.315 Commons arrangements also existed in other parts of the
new nation, but by the early nineteenth century, such arrangements were virtually
extinct.316
In Dividing the Land, Edward T. Price details how American land was
originally parceled out. Price notes that immigrants were attracted to the United
States precisely because of the opportunity for freehold tenure.317 From the
beginning of colonial history, a premium was placed on development to help the
312. After the Norman conquest, all land in England was deemed to be held subject to the monarch’s
ultimate authority. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 257 (3d ed. 1990).
313. Id. at 262-63 (noting that neither lord nor tenant could be said to “own” the land in absolute sense).
314. EDWARD T. PRICE, DIVIDING THE LAND: EARLY AMERICAN BEGINNINGS OF OUR PRIVATE PROPERTY
MOSAIC (1995). Of course, in some cases mineral rights were withheld from land grants.
315. Ellickson, supra note 6, at 1336-42. See also PRICE, supra note 14, at 35-48 (documenting how the
change from communal property to private property rights in the Plymouth colony increased corn production).
316. Banner, supra note 86, at 61, 66.
317. PRICE, supra note 314, at 11.
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colonies gain a better foothold in the new world. An immigrant was given a
parcel of land in fee (typically around fifty acres), but the freehold was perfected
only by actually settling and cultivating the land.318 Thus, while English lords
could allow their land to lie fallow without fear it would be lost, the American
settler knew that the land would be his only if it were transformed into productive
property.
As the country expanded west under the ideal of “manifest destiny,” settlers
willing to brave the wilds were given expansive property rights as a reward.
Under the various Homestead Acts, a premium was placed on establishing
ownership by excluding others, with fences or walls, and by putting the land into
useful production. Common rights were not considered, both because they were
not necessary, but also because they were antithetical to the whole ideal of
development and enclosure.319 Timing also had something to do with the
difference in property distribution; by the time most of the United States was
being settled, commons systems were on their way out in all modern societies.320
Despite these fundamental differences, there are some parallels to the British
experience of common rights preceding enclosure. The best examples come from
the American West, where ranchers used the open range as a vast grazing
commons and cowboys drove cattle hundreds of miles over open lands in the late
1800s.321 On the Chisholm Trail, for example, a typical cattle drive would move a
herd of a few thousand cattle across the Red River from Texas through Oklahoma
up to the railroad stop at Abilene, Kansas, a distance of several hundred miles.
There were many other routes established by the cattle drives. Similarly, traders
established the Santa Fe Trail from Missouri to New Mexico, which the
government recognized as a public road in 1848.322 Settlers moving West used
the Oregon Trail, over 2000 miles long, to reach the West Coast from Missouri.323
Yet, these paths are relatively minor compared to the fabric of trails criss-
crossing England. Moreover, although some of them became highway rights of
way, most of these trails fell into disuse and were abandoned as public easements.
Settlements were laid out in uniform patterns, with the idea that streets and roads
would accommodate travel by carriage and by foot. Therefore, footpaths or other
public access rights were not typically reserved in government grants of land.
318. Id. at 14, 343 (“[A]ttracting settlers and getting the land in production were the immediate aims of
colonial land distribution.”).
319. There were, however, some significant exceptions to this pattern. See Banner, supra note 86, for a
fascinating description of common field system used in St. Louis and surrounding area from 1750-1850.
320. See id. at 66 (“By the time the west was ready for distribution, there was no serious argument to place
any productive land in commons.”).
321. My thanks to Dr. Bradley J. Birzer, Amos Kirk Chair in History at Hillsdale College, for assistance with
this section.
322. U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Santa Fe National Historic Trail, http://
www.nps.gov/safe/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2007).
323. U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Oregon National Historic Trail, http://
www.nps.gov/oreg/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
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Although the United States based its legal doctrine on the received common
law of Britain,324 American courts were quick to adapt those rules to the peculiar
circumstances of the new nation. The stronger version of property rights that
resulted may have grown out of a variety of conditions that differed from the old
world. The greater opportunity for and broader distribution of land ownership in
the United States, for example, may have reduced the need for public rights and
lessened the class-based tension between landholders and non-landholders. Many
large landowners in Britain could trace their holdings to grants from royalty and
land was largely concentrated in a small group of aristocratic owners. Common-
ers resented the idea that “the privileged few could dictate the terms on which the
countryside was used.”325 In contrast, the American landowner class was much
larger and less exclusive, and, having for the most part earned their property
through labor (homesteading) or service in a war, the public presumably felt they
had earned the right to exclude.
Finally, differing cultural mores developed, which are reflected in the literature
and fables of the two countries. Britain produced The Selfish Giant by Oscar
Wilde where a giant turns the local children out of his garden and puts up a sign
indicating that “Trespassers Will Be Prosecuted.”326 The result of this exercise of
the right to exclude is catastrophic: Spring refused to return to the giant’s land
until he finally relents and lets the children back in.327 Keeping natural beauty
away from the public is portrayed as evil and insisting on the right to exclude is
selfish.
Similarly, in The Secret Garden, a classic English children’s book published in
1912 by Frances Hodgson Burnett, two neglected children use nature and
exercise to heal their own physical and mental health.328 The children’s discovery
of the beauty of the gardens, as well as the surrounding moors, instills a belief in
the regenerative power of contact with the natural world, very similar to the
policy behind the right to roam. And significantly, the garden is supposed to be
off-limits to the children, but only by breaking through that barrier do they find
happiness and well-being.329
While many modern American children’s books also celebrate sharing, genera-
tions have been weaned on books that emphasize the dominion of man over
nature. For example, Paul Bunyan was celebrated in print for his nature-clearing
prowess, such as cutting down twenty three trees with one swing of his ax.330 The
324. Bosselman, supra note 58, at 256-57 (describing reliance of American courts on English common law).
325. SHOARD, supra note 13, at 99.
326. OSCAR WILDE, THE SELFISH GIANT (1891). Although Wilde was born in Ireland, he was educated at
Oxford and lived in England much of his life. RICHARD ELLMAN, OSCAR WILDE (Vintage 1988).
327. See WILDE, supra note 326..
328. FRANCIS HODGSEN BURNETT, THE SECRET GARDEN (1912).
329. Another example is Beatrix Potter’s Peter Rabbit, who is celebrated for his attempts to invade the
private garden of evil Mr. McGregor. BEATRIX POTTER, PETER RABBIT (Frederick Warne & Co. 1902).
330. See JAMES STEVENS, PAUL BUNYAN (2001) (describing origins of the legendary figure).
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classic Laura Ingalls Wilder and Willa Cather books celebrate pioneers, primarily
homesteaders, and the hard work they did to make the land their own.331 Western
novels and movies depict the struggle for dominion over the open range as an
effort to bring human control to wild territory.332 Although certainly too much
can be made of the cultural distinction, most would agree that is it extremely
unlikely that an American author would have written a children’s book like The
Selfish Giant, which overtly denigrates the zealous defense of private property
rights.
B. PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE COUNTRYSIDE IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, public access to scenic areas will typically be found in
some form of government-owned property, such as a park. Public easements in
rural areas are mostly limited to old railroad easements opened for public
recreation under the Rails to Trails Act. While a few states have recognized, in
limited instances, the public’s common law right to access beaches or other
public places, for the most part courts have not been willing to grant public
easements absent a strong case for implied dedication. As a result, there is
nothing in the United States that compares to the footpaths of Britain, now
augmented by the right to roam.
Americans do enjoy a wealth of trails on public lands, allowing long hikes
through the breathtaking beauty of national parks, forests and wilderness ar-
eas.333 Several long-distance trails—such as the Appalachian Trail (2160 miles),334
the Pacific Crest Trail (2650 miles),335 and the Continental Divide Trail (3100
miles)336—simply dwarf their British cousins. Many states have long-distance
trails, too. The Centennial Trail in South Dakota, for example, spans 111 miles
through the Black Hills and Custer State Park.337 The 225-mile KATY Trail in
Missouri crosses nearly the entire state.338
Although these trails provide exceptional recreational opportunities, they do
not serve exactly the same functions as the footpath and roaming rights in Britain
331. See, e.g., LAURA INGALLS WILDER, LITTLE HOUSE ON THE PRAIRIE (1935); WILLA CATHER, O PIONEERS!
(1913), reprinted in WILLA CATHER: EARLY NOVELS AND STORIES 133 (The Library of America 1987).
332. See, e.g., JACK SCHAEFER, SHANE, ch.6 (1949) (idealizing the morality of a classic Western hero on the
side of homesteaders in battle against the open range rancher).
333. See James J. Vinch, The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Viewshed Protection for the National
Scenic Trails, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 93, 95 (1999) (describing the system of national trails).
334. National Park Service, Appalachian National Scenic Trail, FAQ, http://www.nps.gov/appa/faqs.htm
(last visited April 7, 2007).
335. Pacific Crest National Scenic Trail, http://www.fs.fed.us/pct/ (Last visited April 7, 2007).
336. Continental Divide Trail Alliance, The Trail Unites Us, http://www.cdtrail.org/page.php (last visited
April 7, 2007).
337. South Dakota Div. of Parks & Rec., Centennial Trail Map, available at http://www.sdgfp.info/Parks/
Regions/Custer/csptrails.htm
338. See bikekatytrail.com (last visited April 7, 2007).
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discussed above. Except for the trails located on old railroad easements, these
long-distance trails are found almost entirely on vast expanses of public lands
(national or state parks or forests), which almost by definition are remote from
civilization and inaccessible to all but serious hikers. These are not trails for the
person who just wants to take a walk before dinner. In many cases, even those
who live nearby have to drive to get to a trailhead.339
This is not to denigrate these trails—they are a magnificent achievement and
glorious for those who have the time and ability to get to them. But they are also
in keeping with the American tradition of separating nature from human habita-
tion. Although some modern developments are incorporating more greenbelts
and trails, for the vast majority of Americans there is still no possibility of
walking out the front door to reach a trail.
State statutes in the United States governing public access to private land focus
mainly on hunting rights.340 About half of the states have enacted “posting” rules,
which generally allow access to private land for hunting, without the landowner’s
specific permission, unless the land has been posted with “no trespassing”
signs.341 The other states require hunters to obtain permission from landowners
before hunting and do not require posting.342 In at least some of these states, the
statutory requirement of posting to prohibit access could apply to recreational
access as well as to hunting, which would allow a hiker to presume permission to
walk across unposted lands.343 In most of the states that require posting, however,
hunting is given a preferred status over public access for other purposes.
In all states, then, the landowner has the option, but not the obligation, to allow
access to lands for public recreation. In states with posting statutes, the roamer
may be able to presume implied permission to hike across private lands unless the
owner has posted “no trespassing” signs. In Alaska, for example, where vast
expanses of land may be unenclosed, the statute presumes permission to walk
across “unimproved and apparently unused land, which is neither fenced nor
otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders,” unless notice
against trespass is either posted or “personally communicated.”344 While this
does not equate to a right to roam, a posting statute could facilitate public access
by eliminating the need to seek permission to hike across unenclosed lands.
339. For example, I recently stayed in Keystone, near Mount Rushmore. The town is nestled in some of the
most beautiful Black Hills scenery, and is typically jam-packed with tourists during the season, yet there are no
walking trails that one can get to without getting into a car and driving at least five miles.
340. See generally Mark R. Sigmon, Note, Hunting and Posting on Private Land in America, 54 DUKE L.J.
549 (2004) (summarizing different types of access laws). Some statutes apply the posting requirement only to
unenclosed or uncultivated lands. Id. at 559.
341. Id. at 558-59 (noting that twenty-nine states require posting to exclude hunters); see, e.g., ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 17-304(D) (forbidding action for trespassing against hunters unless posted).
342. Sigmon, supra note 340, at 560.
343. Id. at 559 n.62 (noting that posting statutes in Washington, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania apply to all
trespassers).
344. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.350(b) (2005).
422 THE GEORGETOWN INT’L ENVTL. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:375
C. COMMON LAW PUBLIC ACCESS RIGHTS
The posting statutes noted above codify a common law notion of implied
permission based on custom that has historically prevailed in most American
states. The Supreme Court recognized this custom in McKee v. Gratz:
The strict rule of the English common law as to entry upon a close must be
taken to be mitigated by common understanding with regard to the large
expanses of unenclosed and uncultivated land in many parts at least of this
country. Over these it is customary to wander, shoot and fish at will until the
owner sees fit to prohibit it. A license may be implied from the habits of the
country.345
However, in contrast to the English cases establishing irrevocable public access
rights based on custom, the American customary license recognized in McKee
could be revoked whenever the landowner wished.
In order to establish an irrevocable right of access, a hiker would have to rely
on doctrines of prescription, implied dedication, or custom. An easement by
prescription would be limited to a specific path and would allow access only for
adjacent landowners rather than the public in general. An implied dedication
would allow for broader access by the general public, but would require proof of
some intent to dedicate for each particular parcel. The most advantageous type of
common law right would rest on custom, because it would allow a court to open
an entire category of lands (e.g., beachfront property) to public access. However,
while courts generally allow rights of way to be established by prescription or
implied dedication, in general courts do not recognize easements based on
custom.346
The New Mexico Supreme Court’s recent treatment of a prescriptive easement
claim illustrates the difficulty of attempting to establish a right of way based on
historic use. In Algermissen v. Sutin, the court rejected a claim by neighbors to
continue their long-time use of a dirt path over defendants’ property to reach a
state park for recreational purposes (such as jogging, horseback riding, hiking,
etc.).347 The court found sufficient evidence to conclude that the neighbors had
the implied permission of the landowners. Evidence of permission from the
1940s was sufficient to support a presumption that the use remained permissive
into the 1990s.
The court also discussed another possible impediment to a prescriptive claim,
the “neighbor accommodation” exception, under which a court does not presume
adverse use when the “claimed right-of-way traverses large bodies of open,
345. McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 126 (1922).
346. See generally Rose, supra note 113, at 739-40 (noting that custom is rarely used in the United States to
support public easement claims).
347. Algermissen v. Sutin, 61 P.3d 176 (N.M. 2002).
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unenclosed, and sparsely populated privately-owned land.”348 Although the court
limited the application of this doctrine to expansive tracts of land, where owners
could not reasonably be expected to have knowledge of the intrusion, it would
effectively preclude many claims attempting to establish roaming rights in
remote scenic areas. The neighbor accommodation doctrine does, however,
encourage landowners to allow neighbors to freely traverse their property,
knowing that they are not thereby in danger of relinquishing their right to
exclude.
Obtaining access to private land based on implied dedication is equally
difficult. The landowner must have somehow indicated an intention to dedicate
the right of way, through his statements or conduct.349 Generations of public
wandering over land may not be enough, because, as the South Carolina Supreme
Court put it, “[d]edication is not implied from the permissive, sporadic and
recreational use of the property.”350
Easements based on public customary use, such as the village green cases in
England,351 are not generally favored in the United States. In Graham v. Walker,
the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected a claim for a right of way based on
custom.352 Residents of Blissville argued that their inhabitants, from time
immemorial, had used the defendant’s land to get to nearby Taftville and
therefore claimed to have established a customary right of way.353 The Connecti-
cut Supreme Court noted that such an easement in gross could be established in
England, but refused to apply English law, noting that the state’s “political and
legal institutions have from the first differed in essential particulars from those of
England.”354 A right of way held by villagers in gross, the court determined,
could not be recognized under American law.355 However, the court was willing
to allow a claim of a prescriptive easement, established by continuous use for the
statutory period, in favor of appurtenant landowners.
Limiting prescriptive rights only to other landowners explicitly favors one
class (those wealthy enough to own land) over another (renters or homeless).
Courts may have adopted this dividing line as a means of preventing easements
from becoming overly burdensome. By limiting the right of way to other
landowners, whose land may be reciprocally burdened in the same way, the rights
would necessarily be limited in scope. However, the result is that the public in
general, and more specifically those who cannot afford to own property them-
selves, are excluded. Thus, the prescriptive easement, even if it can be estab-
348. Id. at 182.
349. C.J.S. DEDICATION § 16 (2007).
350. State v. Beach Co., 248 S.E.2d 115, 119 (S.C. 1978).
351. See supra Section II.C.
352. Graham v. Walker, 61 A. 98, 99-100 (Conn. 1905).
353. Id.
354. Id. at 99.
355. Id. at 99-100 (“To a fluctuating body of that kind no estate in lands can be granted.”).
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lished, would not be the equivalent of the British footpath, which is open to all.
The most prominent decision recognizing access based on custom came from
the Oregon Supreme Court in State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, which recognized a
public right of access to oceanfront beaches.356 Relying on the English doctrine,
the court found that the public had used the dry sand area along Oregon’s Pacific
coast “as long as the land has been inhabited.”357 Requiring a beach-by-beach
determination based on prescription, the court found, would be unduly burden-
some and unnecessary. “Ocean-front lands from the northern to the southern
border,” the court determined, “ought to be treated uniformly.”358
In a later case, the Oregon Supreme Court determined that this declaration of
public access rights based on custom did not constitute a taking of beachfront
owners’ property rights. In Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, the court held that,
under Lucas, the public’s right of access should be considered one of the
“background principles” of state law that inhere in every property owner’s
title.359 Therefore, the property owner never had a right to exclude the public
from the beach and the recognition of that in Thornton did not destroy a
previously existing right.
Although the United States Supreme Court declined to review the Cannon
Beach case, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice O’Connor, dissented from the
certiorari denial.360 Justice Scalia laced his dissent with expressions of doubt
about whether the Oregon Supreme Court was “creating” rather than “describ-
ing” the custom of public access.361 Nevertheless, the majority of the Court
356. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 676-78 (Or. 1969). Along with access to the beaches, the
public’s right to use the beaches themselves is a complex subject based on each state’s application of custom,
prescription, and implied dedication doctrines. See, e.g., Joseph J. Kalo, The Changing Face of the Shoreline:
Public and Private Rights to the Natural and Nourished Dry Sand Beaches of North Carolina, 78 N.C. L. REV.
1869, 1893 n.105 (2000). New Jersey, for example, used the public trust doctrine to grant the public access to
the dry sand portion of the beach to ensure their enjoyment of the foreshore. Borough of Neptune City v.
Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 49 (N.J. 1972); Matthews v. Bay Head Improv. Ass’n, 95 N.J. 306,
323-25, cert. denied, 269 U.S. 821 (1984). This may also include perpendicular, or vertical, access over private
property in certain cases. See Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, 879 A.2d 112, 119 (N.J. 2005).
357. Hay, 462 P.2d at 676-77.
358. Id. at 676.
359. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456-57 (Or. 1993).
360. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 1332 (1994), cert. denied (Scalia, J.
dissenting from denial of petition for certiorari). Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion is truly a case study of his
zeal with regard to property rights. Scalia argued that the Supreme Court of Oregon, in McDonald v. Halvorson,
780 P.2d 714 (Or. 1989), had limited Thornton’s reach to only those areas that could be proven to have been
customarily used by the public. 114 S.Ct. at 1333. McDonald, however, announced that rule only for areas other
than the dry sand area adjacent to the Pacific Ocean. 780 P.2d at 724. McDonald dealt with a freshwater pool not
bordering the ocean, which Scalia does not even mention. See id. at 716. Moreover, it is unusual that the
Supreme Court would tell the Oregon court how to read its own precedent. See, e.g., Cannon Beach, 114 S.Ct. at
1334 n.3, in which Scalia finds the Oregon Supreme Court’s seemingly logical reading of Thornton
“unsupportable.” One is left with the impression that Scalia believes that states are not free to depart from his
own vision of Blackstonian absolutism in property rights.
361. See, e.g., Cannon Beach, 114 S.Ct. at 1335 n.4.
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declined to interfere with this allocation of the right of access to the public.
While an exhaustive survey of coastal access law is beyond the scope of this
article, Oregon’s beach access doctrine based on custom comes closest to the
British cases recognizing recreational easements. The doctrine, however, prevails
in only one state and has been expressly rejected by several others.362 Moreover,
even in Oregon the public right of customary access is limited to beachfront
property; public access for recreational purposes in contexts other than beaches
finds even less support in the courts.363 Other states have granted public access to
beaches using prescriptive easement or implied dedication doctrines.364 There is
a significant difference, however, between these cases granting access across
private land to reach a public resource, such as a beach, and the establishment of a
general “right to roam” across public land for recreational purposes.
D. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON PUBLIC ACCESS: THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE
The most salient difference between United States and British property law is
the limitation on government intrusion contained in the takings clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States constitution. CRoW’s reallocation of property
rights, without compensating the landowners, would almost certainly have been
struck down by American courts as an unconstitutional taking. In Britain,
however, there is no constitutional property protection, although Parliament has
provided compensation for most significant impacts on landowners.365 In this
case, however, compensation was not provided because Parliament felt that the
impact on landowners would be minimal and not worth the cost of setting up a
compensation mechanism. After all, allowing the public to walk over lands such
as mountains or moors, which were not really being used for anything anyway,
would not preclude any existing uses. That sort of balancing approach to the
question of compensation, however, has been banished in American courts by
Supreme Court precedent requiring a categorical approach to the right to exclude.
The “right to exclude” has been enshrined in the United States as “one of the
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
362. See Steven W. Bender, Castles in the Sand: Balancing Public Custom and Private Ownership Interests
on Oregon’s Beaches, 77 OR. L. REV. 913, 914 (1998) (stating that most jurisdictions rely on “parcel-specific
doctrines of easements by prescription and implied dedication”). The Oregon doctrine of customary access has
met with harsh criticism as well. See, e.g., David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach
Access and Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1417 (1996) (critiquing Oregon beach decisions as
“judicial activism”).
363. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.18 cmt. f (2000) (Most jurisdictions “have been
reluctant to recognize prescriptive rights to recreational uses other than on beaches.”).
364. See, e.g., Concerned Citizens of Brunswick v. North Carolina, 404 S.E.2d 677, 682 (N.C. 1991)
(discussing prescriptive easement); Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50, 59 (Cal. 1970) (relying on
implied-dedication theory).
365. Daniel H. Cole, Taking Coase Seriously: Neil Komesar on Law’s Limits, 29 LAW & SOC. INQ. 261, 280
(2004).
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property.”366 The Supreme Court first made this pronouncement in Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, which involved the public’s right to access a private pond that
had been dredged and converted into a marina by connecting it to the nearby bay.
The government argued that this action subjected the pond to the federal
navigational servitude that covers all waters of the United States. The Court,
however, rejected that argument, holding that the imposition of such a servitude
would amount to a taking of property without compensation in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.367
In so holding, the Court explicitly determined that the “right to exclude, so
universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within
th[e] category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensa-
tion.”368 Interestingly, for this view of the right to exclude as “fundamental,” the
Court cited only three sources: a Claims Court case,369 a Fifth Circuit case,370 and
Justice Brandeis’ dissent in an intellectual property case.371 None of these sources
really support the notion that the right to exclude must be absolute. The Claims
Court case, for example, deals with the exclusive occupancy necessary to
establish “Indian title.”372 The Fifth Circuit’s mention of the right to exclude was
pure dicta, occurring in a discussion of when the risk of loss passes to a buyer of
goods.373 Justice Brandeis’ lone dissent quickly qualified his comment about the
right to exclude by noting that it could indeed be modified if “the property is
affected with a public interest.”374
Despite the slender reed upon which the Court declared the “right to exclude”
to be “fundamental” and “essential,” later cases used Kaiser Aetna to further
solidify the absolute nature of this stick in the bundle. In Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV, the Supreme Court held that even the de minimus intrusion of
a cable TV box could not be countenanced without compensation.375 If a small,
mute and stationary object violates the Court’s categorical right to exclude, then a
“right to roam” or other public easement surely would be insupportable.
Indeed, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,376 the Supreme Court
explicitly held that the imposition of a public right of way in exchange for a
building permit constituted a taking of property, which required compensation to
366. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). See generally Rose, supra note 113, at 711-12
(discussing wide agreement regarding importance of right to exclude).
367. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80.
368. Id.
369. United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F.2d 1383 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
370. United States v. Lutz, 295 F.2d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 1961).
371. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“An essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it.”).
372. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F.2d at 1385.
373. Lutz, 295 F.2d at 740.
374. International News Service, 248 U.S. at 250.
375. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982).
376. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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sustain it.377 The public’s need or desire for the easement did not avoid the
constitutional proscription against taking a property right without paying for it.
Moreover, the Court held, the right to build on the property could not be
conditioned on the grant of an easement, a scheme the Court likened to
“extortion.”378
In dissent, Justice Brennan noted that the development condition was in fact
consistent with “settled public expectations,” shaped by the California constitu-
tional provision prohibiting private landowners from obstructing the public’s
access to navigable waters.379 Thus, Brennan concluded, “California has clearly
established that the power of exclusion for which appellants seek compensation
simply is not a strand in the bundle of appellants’ property rights.”380 Brennan
also noted that the burden on the landowners would be slight, because their
privacy would not be appreciably infringed by the few feet of right of way, as the
public could already pass by the house from the wet sand portion of the beach.381
Justice Brennan’s balancing of interests and willingness to find a public
easement inherent in the landowner’s bundle of sticks is much more akin to the
rationale justifying the “right to roam,” but of course his views did not prevail in
Nollan.382 Thus, unless previous use had ripened into a right by prescription or
implied dedication,383 the type of public right of way conferred by CRoW can be
obtained in the United States only by compensating the landowner.384 The
legislature could decide to reallocate the sticks in the bundle, but only by
compensating the losing party.
Congress apparently did just that in the “rails-to-trails” amendment to the
National Trail System Act (NTSA).385 Under the NTSA, the Interstate Com-
377. Id. at 833-34.
378. Id. at 837; see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391, 395-96 (1994) (holding that a bike trail
may be demanded as a condition of development permission only if access demanded is “rough[ly]
proportional” to the additional transportation burden caused by development).
379. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 847-48 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see generally Jerry L. Anderson, Takings and
Expectations: Toward a “Broader Vision” of Property Rights, 37 KAN. L. REV. 529 (1989) (arguing that
landowner expectations must be tempered by public welfare constraint).
380. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 858 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
381. Id. at 853-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (calling intrusion “minimal”).
382. The Nollan decision was 5 to 4, indicating some hope that the majority position will be modified in
future cases, but for now, the pre-eminent place of the “right to exclude” is assured. See also Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (another 5-4 decision reaffirming importance of right to exclude). Justice Stevens in
dissent lamented the Court’s “narrow focus on one strand (the right to exclude) in the property owner’s bundle
of rights.” Id. at 401 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
383. In fact, in Nollan, the public may have already acquired the right of access by prescription or dedication,
but that issue was not before the Court. 483 U.S. at 862 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
384. It could also be possible to condition development permission on the grant of access rights, but only if
the government could establish the proper nexus. It might be possible, for example, to claim that a particular
development would cause an increased burden on existing transportation systems and therefore require a
footpath as an exaction. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (describing requirements of “rough proportionality” test).
385. Nat’l Trail System Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251 (2000). See generally Danaya C. Wright, Eminent
Domain, Exactions, and Railbanking: Can Recreational Trails Survive the Court’s Fifth Amendment Takings
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merce Commission may preserve railroad rights of way for the future by allowing
them to be used, on an indefinite “interim” basis, as recreational trails.386 Under
the terms of most railroad easements, the right of way is lost when railroad use is
abandoned. At that point, full use and ownership of the property would revert to
the fee owner, usually the adjacent landowner. Congress effectively re-wrote the
terms of these easements by declaring, legislatively, that recreational trail use
would not constitute “abandonment” and therefore, the landowner’s reversionary
interest was not triggered.
This type of readjustment in the bundle of sticks is not countenanced by
American courts without compensation. When adjacent landowners claimed that
the NTSA amounted to a taking of their property, the Supreme Court, in Presault
v. Interstate Commerce Commission,387 avoided answering the question by
directing them to seek a remedy, if a taking had occurred, under the Tucker
Act.388 Subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the
conversion of the easements to recreational trail use had worked a taking,
requiring compensation.389 The government had argued that adjacent landowners
never really had any reasonable expectation of recovering the land free of the
easement. Thus, its conversion to trail use did not really take anything.390 The
court, however, adopted a formalistic analysis, finding that the trail was a
physical occupation of plaintiffs’ land, and therefore constituted a taking.391
The government also argued that the original scope of the easement, for
railroad purposes, could be construed to include other public uses, such as
recreational hiking and biking.392 Although Vermont state law, which applied to
the easement interpretation, allowed the scope of the easement to be adjusted to
fulfill its purpose in changing circumstances, the court found that the nature of
recreational trail use was too different from railroad use to fall within its scope.393
While trains were noisy, they were also limited in their frequency, whereas
recreational users may be present at any time and they may be more difficult to
contain within the easement’s boundaries.394
The Rails-to-Trails case indicates how strictly American courts view the right
to exclude.395 Although, to many, a hiker or a biker would seem much less of a
Jurisprudence?, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 399 (2001).
386. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d).
387. Presault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 4 (1990).
388. Id. at 17.
389. See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
390. Id. at 1539-40.
391. Id. at 1540.
392. Id. at 1541.
393. Id. at 1541-44.
394. Id. at 1543.
395. A notable exception among state court decisions is State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971), in which
activists who came onto property to aid migrant workers were absolved of trespass charges. In thus modifying
the right to exclude, the court noted that “[p]roperty rights serve human values. They are recognized to that end,
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burden on the adjacent landowner than a passing train, courts refuse to engage in
any balancing of burdens in protecting the right to exclude. Any intrusion is
actionable, and even where the public owns a right of way, its scope will be
strictly construed. The case strongly indicates that any attempt to impose an
easement along the lines of CRoW would not be sustainable absent compensa-
tion.
E. ARGUMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL PUBLIC ACCESS RIGHTS
[A]t daybreak I am the sole owner of all the acres I can walk over. It is not only
boundaries that disappear, but also the thought of being bounded. Expanses
unknown to deed or map are known to every dawn, and solitude, supposed no
longer to exist in my county, extends on every hand as far as the dew can reach.
—Aldo Leopold396
Given the legal, cultural and historical differences between the two countries is
there anything America can learn from the British adoption of the right to roam?
It is extremely unlikely that a state or the federal legislature will suddenly decide
to adopt the equivalent of CRoW in the United States, even if it were constitu-
tional. Yet, the story behind CRoW contains some interesting lessons Americans
could profit from studying.
First, as I have pointed out in at greater length elsewhere,397 Britain’s right to
roam represents a rather dramatic re-allocation of one of the sticks in the property
rights bundle from the landowner to the public. The example teaches us that the
composition of the bundle is not necessarily immutable, and that changes may be
desirable to better reflect contemporary society’s needs and values. Of course, the
relative stability of property rights is extremely valuable, because it honors
settled expectations and therefore promotes economic transactions and furthers
our desire for fairness. But property rights must evolve and the right to roam
reminds us that, in the end, the recognition of the private owners’ rights involves
a trade-off with public interests that should not be ignored.
Second, the right to roam represents a welcome return to a more interrelated,
functional approach to property, a position once thought to be banished to the
wastebins of history. UCLA law professor Stuart Banner has pointed out that
Americans have become so accustomed to the distinction between public and
private property, that they have lost the ability to imagine possible gradations
between the two.398 We have public property, for hiking and wandering, and
private property, to stay off of. Property theorists spend a lot of time on the
and are limited by it.” Id. at 372.
396. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 44 (Ballantine Books 1970).
397. See Jerry L. Anderson, Comparative Perspectives on Property Rights: the Right to Exclude, 56 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 539 (2006).
398. Banner, supra note 86, at 63-64.
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question of whether property is best held by private owners or in common, but
very little on anything in between.399 The right to roam reminds Americans that it
is possible to allow the public certain limited uses, while leaving the fee in private
hands. There are numerous ways, in other words, to allocate the bundle of sticks
without abandoning the idea of private property in general.
Finally, the right to roam suggests that Americans should consider whether
they have undervalued the public access side of this equation, and whether there
are ways, consistent with their own culture and legal framework, to further the
important public interests represented by CRoW.400 It is, in fact, possible to
construct a strong argument in favor of modifying the formalistic notion of an
absolute right to exclude. Interestingly, none of the other “sticks” in the
landowner’s bundle have acquired the categorical status of the right to exclude.
Yet, there is little reason to support the absolute form of this right.
In terms of morality, there are strong arguments to be made in favor of more
public rights to private property. Many philosophers assert that land is, at bottom,
the “common inheritance” of all.401 It has been parceled out for reasons of
economic efficiency and fairness, but there is no moral imperative against
allowing access. Indeed, the moral argument suggests that true freedom should
include the right to walk wherever one pleases, unless the landowner can make a
case that it is unduly burdensome.402 Surely Americans would balk at allowing
private owners to cut off the ability to boat down the Mississippi, because it
would interfere with the freedom to travel. Why, then, do they allow the right to
travel over land to be cut off at every fencepost?
In economic terms, the argument for an absolute right to exclude fares no
better. In enacting the right to roam, Parliament weighed the potential for damage
to individual landowners from public intrusion and found very little to be
concerned about, with regard to these types of land—mountains, moors, heath,
and downland—where crops would not be growing and little damage could be
done. The value to the public, however, as described in Section III above, was
much higher than the expected costs. Naturally, given the estimated costs and
benefits, individual landowners could reach agreements with the public regarding
399. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 113, at 720-21 (discussing “standard paradigm” which recognizes only
public and private property).
400. See Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, The Idea of Property in Land, in LAND LAW: THEMES AND
PERSPECTIVES 38-39 (Susan Bright & John Dewar eds., 1998), quoted in UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 6, at 93 n.27
(“In a crowded urban environment, where recreational, associational, and expressional space is increasingly at a
premium, an unanalyzed, monolithic privilege of . . . exclusion is no longer tenable.”).
401. MILL, supra note 1, Book II, Ch. II, § 6 (“[L]and of every country belongs to the people of that
country.”); Thomas Paine, AGRARIAN JUSTICE (1796), in MARK PHILIP, THOMAS PAINE: RIGHTS OF MAN,
COMMON SENSE AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS 417-19 (1975); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), in THE PORTABLE JEFFERSON 395, at 396-97 (M. Peterson ed. 1975) (“[E]arth is given
as a common stock for man to labour and live on” and property rights should be modified if necessary to serve
greater needs of society.).
402. See SHOARD, supra note 13, at 147, 287-87.
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access rights, in exchange for compensation. But the transaction costs of reaching
individualized agreements for access would prevent them in most cases.403
Professor Ellickson suggests, however, that in general the right to exclude may
be more economically efficient than the right to roam:
If decentralized negotiations between Blackstonian neighbors cannot be counted
on to generate an efficient transportation network, why shouldn’t a group
simply confer on its members reciprocal and routine privileges to transport
themselves across all private land? The reason is manifest: entrants may
damage crops, commit thefts, and do other mischief. Reciprocal rights of
passage would undermine the basic virtue of parcelization, namely, the relative
ease with which a person can monitor boundary crossings, as opposed to the
quality of an entrant’s behavior. If privileges of passage were routine, guard
dogs and motion detectors would lose most of their usefulness.404
Ellickson goes on to posit that exceptions to the general right to exclude occur
only when they are efficient; for example, where “the would-be entrant would
objectively value entry far more than the landowner would objectively suffer
from the entry” or where the burden of monitoring the trespass would be
slight.405 In addition, the likelihood of damage to the landowner from the trespass
should be considered: “The less vulnerable a tract is to damage, the more likely
nonowners are deemed privileged to enter it.”406 Finally, Ellickson suggests that
modifications to the right to exclude should be sensitive to transactions costs
associated with gaining the owner’s permission to enter.407
These considerations seem to support the right to roam as set forth in CRoW.
Parliament has chosen specific categories of land that contain the most elements
of scenic beauty, thereby representing high value to the public, while at the same
time presenting little potential for damage. Moreover, because landowners
probably rarely spend much time or resources monitoring their moors or
mountains, in most cases, monitoring costs probably would not greatly increase.
These are not lands where it is likely that public entrants will “damage crops,
commit theft or do other mischief,” because there is little to steal, and no crops
are grown on the mountains and moors. Of course, it may be that the British
“code of conduct,” the unwritten law governing public behavior when exercising
the right to roam, makes the intrusion less worrisome as well.
Thus, as long as the right to roam is limited to those types of land where the
balance tips most strongly in favor of public use, it likely comports with
403. See Banner, supra note 98, at 360-61; Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE
L.J. 1163, 1209-10 (1999) (arguing that Nollan’s formalistic approach to labeling private property rights may
block the “optimal social level of use of beaches”).
404. Ellickson, supra note 5, at 1382.
405. Id. at 1382-83.
406. Id. at 1383.
407. Id.
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economic principles.408 H.G. Wells put it succinctly, in expressing his support for
an individual’s right to roam “where his presence will not be destructive of its
special use, nor dangerous to himself, nor seriously inconvenient to his fellow
citizens.”409 Mill similarly argued that public access should not be denied “except
to the extent necessary to protect the produce against damage, and the owner’s
privacy against invasion.”410 According to Mill, “[t]he species at large still
retains, of its original claim to the soil of the planet which it inhabits, as much as
is compatible with the purposes for which it has parted with the remainder.”411
Short of a revolution in American thinking about the right to exclude, however,
it is difficult to imagine serious modifications to the right to exclude anytime
soon. It is much more useful, therefore, to imagine other ways to facilitate
movement toward greater public access. It is possible, for example, that many
landowners would voluntarily allow the public to use their lands for roaming. For
those lands, there are a number of minor impediments that could be easily
removed. First, there is a lack of information. While it is easy to find the “no
trespassing” sign, landowners rarely hang out a “trespassers welcome” sign. The
state government agency in charge of natural resources could facilitate the
collection and dissemination of information about which areas are “open for
walking,” perhaps in the form of a map. Legislation could provide a voluntary
mechanism for registering land as open for access, while providing rules for
those taking advantage of the scheme to lessen damage or privacy concerns.
Landowners would be encouraged to allow hikers if they could be assured that
they would be immune from liability for any injuries and that the use could not
ripen into some sort of prescriptive easement.
In Kansas, for example, the state wildlife agency instituted a novel program to
use hunting license fees to enter into long-term contracts with private landowners
to allow access for “walk-in hunting.” In exchange for a modest payment, the
landowner agrees to allow hunting in designated areas. The agency takes care of
sign posting, and the landowner receives liability protection.412
Recognizing the clear public benefits from additional access to the countryside
might also lead legislatures to investigate greater use of their condemnation
authority for this purpose. The government readily condemns land for highways
to ensure automobiles can go from Point A to Point B, but often seems reluctant
408. Henry Smith has noted that a simple right to exclude avoids the significant “delineation” costs of more
complex arrangements, but that in certain cases the added benefits of more elaborate schemes could outweigh
these costs. See Henry E. Smith, Self-Help and the Nature of Property, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 69, 78 (2005).
409. H.G. Wells, On War Aims: The Rights of Man, THE TIMES, Oct. 25, 1939, at 6.
410. MILL, supra note 1, Book II, Ch. 2, § 6. Mill complained about the “pretension” of two dukes who shut
off mountain scenery from public roaming merely so as not to disturb wild animals they wanted to hunt. Mill
called it an “abuse” of the right of property. Id.
411. Id.
412. KANSAS DEP’T OF WILDLIFE & PARKS, WALK-IN HUNTING ACCESS PROGRAM, http://www.kdwp.state.ks.us/
other_services/private_landowner_assistance/wildlife/walk_in_hunting (last visited Feb. 2, 2007).
2007] BRITAIN’S RIGHT TO ROAM 433
to use that authority to allow people to walk there. Public access could also be
made a condition of government payments for agricultural conservation set-
asides.
The British experience reminds us of the importance of ensuring public access
to natural areas, even those within private lands. Americans, however, are more
likely to use a different set of tools to achieve that goal. As the nation matures and
the cultural baggage of the homestead era begins to fade, Americans may begin to
place more emphasis on the public’s freedom to roam and less on protecting an
absolute right to exclude.
V. CONCLUSION
[A] race that neglects or despises this primitive gift, that fears the touch of the
soil, that has no footpaths, no community of ownership in the land which they
imply, that warns off the walker as a trespasser, that knows no way but the
highway, the carriage-way, that forgets the stile, the footbridge . . . is in a fair
way to far more serious degeneracy.
—John Burroughs413
Unfortunately, Burroughs may have had the United States in mind when
describing his view of a degenerate society. It is clear that the American public
places far less value on a countryside walk than the British do. Partially, this
difference is due to a harsher climate, so that it sometimes seems that the weather
moves from intolerably hot and humid to intolerably cold without many days of
glory in between. Nevertheless, many Americans lament their separation from
the environment: as they move from their air-conditioned houses to their
air-conditioned cars to their air-conditioned offices, they can go weeks at a time
without coming in contact with nature. Americans can get exercise, surely, at the
health club, but it is most often while watching CNN or listening to their iPod.
Along the way to this hermetically sealed existence, Americans may have lost
something that a walk in the countryside might help them regain.
Britain’s right to roam can easily be derided by critics as the product of a
society verging on socialism.414 The review of the historic progression of access
rights in Britain shows that CRoW can also be seen as the restoration, in part, of a
freedom that commoners lost during the enclosure period. It can also be viewed
as a step back toward a functional approach to property rights, moving away from
a strictly spatial system, and achieving a greater good. Moreover, it can be seen as
a refutation of Blackstonian absolutism, proving that furthering the goals of our
property rights system requires balancing private and public interests, rather than
413. John Burroughs, Exhilarations of the Road, reprinted in TAPLIN, supra note 28, at 17-18.
414. During the debates on CRoW, some members of Parliament called it just that. See, e.g., 328 Parl. Deb.
H.C. (6th ser.) (1999) 672-75 (statement of Mr. Peter Atkinson), available at http://www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/cm199899/cmhansrd/vo990326/debindx/90326-x.htm.
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supporting a categorical right to exclude. And perhaps the right to exclude is not
as “essential” a stick in the bundle as the U.S. Supreme Court has heretofore
regarded it.
In Scandinavia, “allemansra¨tten” gives everyone the right to cross the private
property of another. Allemansra¨tten translates, very simply, into “the rights of
everyone.” Look out across the countryside where you live and ask, why
shouldn’t I have the right to go there? Look at a nearby mountain and ask, isn’t
the right to walk up to that peak and see the view no less mine than that the right
to swim in the ocean or put my canoe in the river? Would my life be different if I
could walk out my front door and head across the hills to discover who knows
what? Shouldn’t true freedom include the fundamental right to go where one will,
as long as no one else is hurt by it?
Britain’s resurrection of the right to roam causes us to ask these questions.
Americans undoubtedly will arrive at somewhat different answers than the
British have. But studying CRoW highlights the significant public values at stake,
which we may be able to accommodate in ways that are consistent with our own
system and culture.
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